NA by Roulston, Thomas G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998-09
Analysis of the transformation process of general
detail sailors
Roulston, Thomas G.















   
  
 
      
   
 
   
  
    
  
        
  
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Fonn Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of infonnation is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources,
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of infonnation. Send commentS regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this
collection of infonnation, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Infonnation Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office ofManagement and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
J. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
September 1998 Master's Thesis
4. Analysis of the Transformation Process of General Detail Sailors 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Thomas G. Roulston
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORINGIMONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORlNGIMONITORlNG
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position ofthe Department ofDefense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis investigates the possibility of a training gap between course content at the Navy Recruit Training Command
(RTC) and the needs of the fleet. The focus is on the internal and external environments that may drive decisions and
curriculum changes at RTC. General Detail (GENDET) seamen with less than two years ofservice were studied to reflect the
direct effects ofRTC's mission and to determine RTC effectiveness in transforming civilians to sailors and meetingfleet needs.
The study found that RTC appears to function in a political/reactive configuration, which may drive many ofthe curriculum
changes. RTC's curriculum is designed as a military socialization process as part ofthe transformation process into the Navy.
RTC does not, however, appear to instill work ethic, pride in selfand the Navy institution, or respect for authority. The fleet
desires sailors with the aforementioned attributes. Additionally, a comparative analysis was conducted between the current
RTC curriculum and the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS). NEOCS determines Naval Standards
for knowledge, skills, and abilities based on each pay grade and rating. It was found that RTC should review NEOCS to
incorporate more hands-on training, all recruits should be put in leadership roles while at RTC, Recruit Division Commander
(RDC) training time is not standardized, and RTC should review the RDC Excellence Awardprogram.
14. SUBJECT TERMS "Recruit Training" "Navy" 15. NUMBER OF
PAGES 102
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATION OF
TION OF REPORT CATION OF THIS PAGE TION OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102
        
                          
                          
                     
                      
I                
    
             
     
        
    
     
        
   
                    
            
      
       
     
                  
                     
                    
                   
                   
                   
                      
               
              
                     
                  
               
      
     
       
  
  
   
  
   
    




     
      
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS OF GENERAL DETAIL
SAILORS
Thomas G. Roulston
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 1990
Submitted in partial fulfillment
ofthe requirements for the degree of






Lee Edwards, Thesis Co-Advisor
Reuben Harris, Chairman
Department of Systems Management
111
       




   
    
     
    
       
     
  
   
  
   




This thesis investigates the possibility of a training gap between course content at 
the Navy Recruit Training Command (RTC) and the needs of the fleet. The focus is on the 
internal and external environments that may drive training decisions and curriculum 
changes at RTC. General Detail (GENDET) seamen with less than two years of service 
were studied to reflect the direct effects of RTC's mission and to determine RTC 
effectiveness in transforming civilians to sailors and meeting fleet needs. This study found 
that RTC appears to function in a political/reactive configuration, which may drive many of 
the curriculum changes. RTC's curriculum is designed as a military socialization process as 
part of the transformation process into the Navy. RTC does not, however, appear to instill 
work ethic, pride in self and the Navy institution, or respect for authority. The fleet desires 
sailors with the a±:orementioned attributes. Additionally, a comparative analysis was 
conducted between the current RTC curriculum and the Navy Enlisted Occupational 
Classification System (NEOCS). NEOCS determines Naval Standards for knowledge, 
skills, and abilities based on each pay grade and rating. It was found that RTC should 
review NEOCS to incorporate more hands-on training, all recruits should be put in 
leadership roles while at R TC, Recruit Division Commander (RDC) training time is not 
standardized, and RTC should review the RDC Excellence Award program. 
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Many Navy leaders-from E-7 to 0-9-have complained openly in the Navy Times, 
Proceedings, and other Navy periodicals that today's young sailor lacks discipline and 
military bearing. Some primary complaints are that young sailors today do not believe in 
the Navy's core values, lack a strong work ethic, lack pride in ownership and self, and have 
little respect for authority. Some leaders, who have complained, blame society as a whole 
for the lack of these values, while others believe recruit training is responsible. 
The mission statement of Navy Recruit Training Command (RTC) is, "Transform 
civilians into motivated and disciplined sailors, prepare recruits for follow-on specialized 
. training, and to prepare recruits for service in the fleet." (RTC Brief to Defense Secretary 
Cohen, September, 1997) RTC supports fleet readiness by "instilling Navy core values, 
warrior ethos and impeccable military bearing." (RTC Brief to Defense Secretary Cohen, 
September, 1997) 
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study is to analyze key factors of the RTC training process in 
meeting the needs of the fleet for a General Detail (GENDET) sailor. (See Figure 1) Figure 
1 is presented as a conceptual model. The model provides a point of reference for achieving 
the purpose of the study and is explained in d~tail in the section Scope and Methodology. 
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This study focuses on the perceptions and experiences of fleet leaders and GENDET 
seamen with respect to RTC meeting the needs of the fleet in its training curriculum, and 
RTC curriculum content with respect to the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification 
System (NEOCS). 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
GENDET seamen are used as the study baseline for analyzing RTC training 
effectiveness. To investigate a possible training gap between training at R TC and fleet 
needs, GENDET seamen with less than two years of service are studied to determine RTC 
effectiveness in transforming civilians to sailors and in meeting fleet needs. GENDETs 
were chosen because, compared to all other sailors, they receive the least amount of 
training-two weeks of apprenticeship training-before being detailed to various ships in 
the fleet. These sailors work in Deck Division and are know as "deck seamen." As deck 
seamen, their primary functions are to conduct preventative maintenance, line handling, 
damage control, and stand various watches. Their behaviors and attitudes should provide 
the most direct indication of preparation for the fleet that sailors receive at RTC. 
Figure I identifies complex factors that may lead to possible training difficulties. 
Figure I begins with societal factors in the recruiting base for the military. Once 
individuals from society are accessed into the military, they are sent to a service-designed 
boot camp, in this case the Navy. The factors involved that determine training content are 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Graphic of Thesis 
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Training Division (ATD) for two weeks of training and are then detailed to the fleet. Some 
factors regarding fleet needs are listed. This simple design coupled with its complex 
factors-from recruiting to entry into the fleet- may cause possible training gaps for the 
GENDET sailor. 
The methodology used for this research was direct observation of the RTC training 
process and formal interviews with four groups at RTC: (1) recruits; (2) Recruit Division 
Commanders (RDCs); (3) RTC classroom instructors; and (4) RTC staff personnel. Fleet 
interviews were conducted aboard three ships, the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), USS 
Chancellorsville (CG-62), and USS Juneau (LPD-l 0). Fleet interviews were conducted with 
three groups onboard each ship: (1) First Lieutenant Division Officers; (2) Deck Chief Petty 
Officers and (3) Deck Seamen (GENDET). The interviews are designed to gain insight to 
perceived attitudes from recruits, RDCs, and R TC staff personnel on training issues. Fleet 
interviews are to gain perceived attitudes toward RTC training and fleet needs. 
Additionally, RTC's mission statement and training methodologies are compared to 
the naval standard knowledge and skills requirements listed in NEOCS for enlisted pay 
grade E-2. The NEOCS is a segment of the Manual of Navy Enlisted Manpower and 
Personnel Classifications and Occupational Standards (NA VPERS 18068E). NEOCS is 
compared to RTC's curriculum because it contains the Naval Standards required for each 
pay grade and is the basis for implementing and supporting actions for recruit training. 
Naval Standards are the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for accomplishing tasks, 
duties and responsibilities 
4 
in that pay grade. The NEOCS is also used to compare the perceived needs of the fleet 
based on the required Naval Standards for pay grade E-2. 
D. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
The study will benefit RTC and the fleet. RTC will benefit by having a better 
understanding of fleet needs through fleet leaders' perceptions of GENDET output, and 
R TC may better utilize their training time to enhance training based on the standard naval 
requirements for pay grade E-2. Fleet leaders will benefit by enhanced readiness if RTC is 
able to enhance its curriculum based on recommendations of this study. Fleet leaders will 
benefit from having a broader understanding of the external influences on RTC and the 
environment in which training is conducted. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II is a literature review. Chapter III describes the data collection methods 
used in this study. The results of the interviews and observations are examined in Chapter 
IV. In this chapter, main themes are developed from the attitudes and opinions expressed 
by recruits, RDCs, RTC staff, fleet leaders, and GENDETs. Excerpts of the interviews are 
presented to support these themes. Additionally, a comparative analysis is conducted 
between current RTC curriculum and NEOCS. Chapter V presents a summary of the study, 
conclusions, and recommendations for RTC, and recommendations for further research. 
5 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The literature review explores areas of concern that may lead to deficiencies in 
recruit training at Recruit Training Command (RTC), and perceived problems with today's 
young sailor in the fleet. A review of the civil-military gap may give insight to those being 
recruited or why there are shortfalls in recruiting. The widening civil-military gap may play 
a role in RTC curriculum changes. Recruiting shortfalls may be related to the civil-military 
gap, which may lead to changes in RTC's training methodologies. Recruit Training 
Command is central to this study and its curriculUII]. changes may be related to changing 
civil-military relations. Organizational configurations are discussed to understand the 
internal and external influences on RTC's curriculum. Lastly, the Navy Enlisted 
Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) is discussed to provide insight to training 
requirements for recruit training. 
B. THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP 
A civil-military gap is evident in some congressional policy-decisions concerning 
military affairs. (Waldman, 1996). These decisions have lead to Navy recruiting shortfalls, 
which have, in effect, determined how Recruit Training Command (RTC) conducts training 
for recruits in preparation for the fleet. (Green, 1997) 
The civil-military gap in today's government may be a result of a lack of military 
knowledge among civilian decision makers. Amy Waldman (November, 1996), a 
Washington Monthly reporter, states, "civilian leaders not serving isn't just morally 
7 
problematic; it's pragmatically so." Waldman also says, " ... to command the military, a 
civilian must have the military's respect. To earn the military's respect, the civilian must 
understand military culture. Fewer and fewer civilian leaders do." 
Harvard political scientist Michael Desch concluded in a recent assessment of post-
Cold War decision-making in the United States that civilians are now apparently less able 
"to get the military to do what they want them to do" than they were during the Cold War 
(Ricks, 1997). According to the Washington Monthly (November 1996), close to 60 percent 
of the men in the Senate are veterans and only 36 percent of those in the House are veterans. 
Only 20 percent of the Senate-confirmed Clinton appointees are veterans, and only four 
percent of the White House staff. Ricks (1997) feels that Charlie Moskos is pointing in the 
right direction when he says that American political and economic elites generally don't 
understand the military (Ricks, 1997). Further, James Burk, a professor of sociology, Texas 
A&M University, explains that American people will not tolerate casualties when they 
dislike a policy or do not understand it, as was true for Somalia. (Ricks, 1997) 
Other actions that have widened the civil-military gap are how the current 
Administration, according to Ricks (1997), bungled the Somalia mission, invaded Haiti, and 
enforced a peace agreement in Bosnia. All these military movements were made without 
military background in the senior post of the National Security COUl}cil. This 
misunderstanding of the military is dangerous for both the military and the civilian 
popUlation. Mutual'distrust between the nation's political elites and military leaders could 
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ultimately undercut U.S foreign policy, making it more difficult to use force effectively 
(Ricks, 1997). 
Retired Admiral Stanley Arthur, who commanded U.S. naval forces in the Gulf War 
explains, "Today, the armed forces are no longer representative of the people they serve. 
More and more, enlisted men and women as well as officers are beginning to feel that they 
are special, better than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an armed force serving 
a democracy" (Ricks, 1997:69). According to Ricks (1997), this is the beginning of several 
trends underway in civilian society and the post-Cold War military that widen the social-
military gap creating an isolated and alienated military. 
Former chief historian of the Air Force, Richard H. Kohn, argues that officers have 
changed since the Cold War in the way they act and feel: "I sense an ethos that is different. 
They talk about themselves as 'we,' separate from society. They see themselves as 
different, morally and culturally." (Ricks, 1997:70). Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army 
colonel, who is executive director of the Foreign Policy Institute at 10hns Hopkins 
University's School of Advanced International Studies, suggests, "There is a deep-seated 
suspicion in the U.S. military of society that is part of the Vietnam hangover-'You guys 
betrayed us once, and you could do it again. '" This suspicion, he added, "isn't going away, 
it's being transmitted to a new generation of officers" (Ricks, 1997:73). 
According to Ricks (1997), there has been widespread agreement over the past few 
decades that American society has become more fragmented, more individualistic, and less 
disciplined, with institutions such as the church, family, and school wielding less influence 
9 
on shaping our youth's value system. The changed values put society at odds with the 
classic military values of sacrifice, unity, self-discipline, and the interests of the group 
before the individual. 
Ricks (1997) followed a Marine platoon through basic training and concluded that 
the recruits were experiencing, in a very special way, the widening gap between today's 
military and civilian America. The re-entry shock upon leaving recruit training appears to 
be greater now than it was in the past. Retired Marine Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor 
said, "When I got out of boot camp, in 1946, society was different. It was more disciplined, 
and most Americans trusted the government. Most males had some military experience. It 
was an entirely different society-<me that thought more about its responsibilities that its 
rights" (Ricks, 1997:68). 
Similarly, United States Marine Corps Sergeant Major James Moore, now retired 
but at that time the senior sergeant at Parris Island, commented, "It is difficult to go back to 
a society of 'What's in it for me?' when a Marine has been taught the opposite for so long. 
When I look at society today, I see a group of young people without direction because of 
the lack of teaching of moral values at home and in school. We see that when we get them 
. in recruit training. The recruits are smarter today-they run rings around what we were 
able to do, on average. Their problems are moral problems: .lying, cheating, and stealing, 
and the very fact of being committed" (Ricks, 1997:68). 
A related issue is that most Americans only pay attention to the military when they 
see news of a sexual-abuse scandal or a policy incongruent with societal norms (princeton 
10 
Gallop Poll, May, 1998). This lack of attention toward understanding military roles and 
missions underscores the separation between civilian society and the military. According to 
the Princeton Gallup Poll (May 1998), concern about foreign policy, international relations, 
or war is almost totally missing from the forefront of American concerns. This stands in 
sharp contrast to many other periods since World War II when foreign policy issues 
dominated the public's responses to the question of civilian concern for international issues 
and the military. In the early 1950s, the Korean War was the nation's top problem. The 
threat of war, nuclear proliferation and communism dominated in mid to late 1950s, and 
into the 1960s. The Vietnam War moved to the forefront of the public's concerns in 1965, 
and remained a dominant problem well into the early 1970s. War and peace issues also 
were highly visible through the mid-Reagan years of the 1980s, and again in 1990 and 1991 
at the time of the Gulf War tensions. Today, in an environment in which communism as a 
threat has essentially evaporated, only four percent of Americans mention international 
issues or foreign affairs concerns to other Americans in casual conversation (The Gallup 
Organization, May, 1998). 
The military's confidence rating, according to another Princeton Gallup Poll (August 
1997), has dropped since last year's 66 percent confidence rating, to a 60 percent rating this 
year. Perhaps this drop is a result of the lingering effects of the highly visible adultery and 
sexual harassment charges associated with members of the military over the past year. 
Although the military remains at the top of the Gallup confidence list, its numbers are down 
from previous ratings in this decade and are, in fact, at their lowest since 1988 (The Gallup 
11 
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Organization, August, 1997). The military received its all-time high confidence rating in a 
poll conducted immediately after the end of the Gulf War in March of 1991, at which time 
85 percent of the public expressed high confidence in the nation's armed forces. Confidence 
in the military generally remained between 64 percent and 69 percent during five 16-month 
measurement periods since that time. 
Eitelberg and Binkin argue that today's youth have grown up in an era marked by 
apparent U.S. national security failures. Because of the media coverage of these apparent 
failures, young Americans appear to have less understanding-if not less appreciation-for 
the military establishment and its role in American society. (Eitelberg and Binkin, 1982). 
Dramatic changes have made the military less appealing to today's youth based on 
their norms, values, mores, and cultural ethos. A comment published in the Utne Reader-
the Reader's Digest of the New Age crowd---captured the disdain for today's military based 
on the Tailhook and Aberdeen scandals, "it's hard to imagine why any woman--or any man 
with a conscience-would want to join the military" (Ricks, 1997). 
Hence, it may appear that the civil-military gap addresses society's generalized view 
of the military. If society has a poor attitude toward the military and its governing power-
Congress-this may explain recruiting problems, which are discussed below. Recruiting 
problems, in turn, influence military readiness through low recruiting numbers. If military 
readiness is being influenced through low recruiting numbers, then RTC may change its 
curriculum to ensure those recruited remain in the Navy while attending RTC. 
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C. RECRUITING ISSUES 
According to the Chief of Naval Operations (Nary Administrative Message 
126/98), the Navy will not meet the required Fiscal Year 98 accession goal of 55,321, 
which indicates just how difficult a recruiter's job has become. There is negative press 
about all branches of the service, the United States economy is considered booming, some 
parents refuse to let their children enlist by calling their Congress persons to intervene, and 
the Navy requires applicants to have a high school diploma and be drug free. McIntire-
Peters (1996) estimated it takes a recruiter an average of 140 to 160 contacts before one new 
recruit is signed. Because of the entrance requirements and high contact rate, the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) has suggested the need for more recruiters. CNO, Navy 
Administrative Message 126/98, has allowed qualified E-4 personnel to request recruiter 
duty to assist in meeting personnel end-strength numbers as required by the Chief of Naval 
Personnel. In the past, a recruiter had to be in paygrades E-5 to E-8 to be considered for 
recruiter duty. The CNO stated in his message that "Navy leadership is actively pursuing a 
broad range of initiatives to increase accessions, getting additional recruiters in the field is 
the backbone or our effort to establish a steady-state effective recruiting program" (CNO, 
1998:2). 
According to a Navy Times article (May 1998), the Navy is the only service not 
meeting its recruiting goals. Admiral Barbara McGann, Chief of Naval Recruiting, explains 
four reasons for the difficulties in recruiting: (1) today's young people don't look at the 
military as a good way to start their working lives; (2) they are not being influenced by 
13 
adults to sign up because fewer adults have a military background; (3) they don't want to 
commit to a four-year enlistment; and (4) they think education gives them a better chance at 
larger paychecks later in life than service to their country. According to John Burlage (May 
1998), Navy Times staff reporter, most of the shortfalls have been with General Detail 
(GENDET) sailors, but now the emphasis is on the nuclear-qualified sailors. The CND has 
ordered ",lOre recruiters into the field, but according to Charles Moskos, in an interview 
with Navy Times (May 1998), "The Navy has to recapture some of that old, 'Join the Navy 
and see the world' mystique. It's traditional and more timely in the 2pt century than ever 
before." 
Admiral McGann explains that some of the recruiting problems stem from the NaVy 
not having a clearly defined image that generates enthusiasm for enlistment. Today's 
message focuses on public service and the Navy's core values of honor, courage, and 
commitment. Moskos explains that today's youth want the best of both worlds: travel, 
adventure, and education. 
Because of the recruiting shortfalls, Kitfield (1998) explains that it is imperative to 
recognize the changing face of the military. Ever since the end of the draft in 1973, the 
services have struggled to attract the bright young adults required to operate in an 
increasingly high-tech military. With a shrinking manpower pool, the military cannot 
afford to conduct rites designed to weed out the weak and scare off potential performers. 
There has been a decrease of young Americans of recruitment age and there is a robust 
14 
economy with record employment levels. These factors have made the task of recruiting 
difficult in recent years and have changed the dynamics of training at RTC. 
The shrinking manpower pool and highly selective requirements for recruiting may 
be a leading factor in the changes that have been made to RTC's curriculum. RTC has had 
to adopt new training methodologies to keep attrition levels low (Green, 1997). 
In today's society, the military service does not appear to be an attractive vehicle in 
beginning one's life. This attitude makes recruiting qualified personnel difficult. These 
civilian resources for manning the Navy are in high demand and Navy leadership and 
recruiters are trying to find a better way to gain these resources. Civilians who have been 
recruited enhance military readiness. Perhaps curriculum changes have been made at RTC 
to ensure RTC's vision of supporting fleet readiness. 
D. RECRillT TRAINING COMMAND 
The current mission of the RTC is to transform civilians into motivated and 
disciplined apprentice sailors, prepare recruits for follow-on specialized training, and 
prepare recruits for service in the fleet. RTC's vision is to support fleet readiness by 
developing our nation's volunteers into sailors instilled with Navy core values, warrior 
ethos, and impeccable military bearing. The goal is for recruits to graduate fully capable 
and eager to meet the challenges of the 2pt century Navy. Historically, Zurchery (1967) 
explains, the role of RTC has been to decivilianize and role-depossess individuals. 
Depersonalization begins when an individual completes the oath of office at the Military 
Enlisted Processing Station (MEPS), just before being sent to RTC. 
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RTC views a new recruit as an individual with a well-developed personality, a 
civilian frame of reference, and a set of cultural values and expectancies that are not 
compatible with RTC's mission and organization (Zurchery, 1967). The adjustment 
problem is for the recruit and comes in the form of reorienting one's behavior from a 
reference point as a civilian to a military standard. This is not an easy task for RTC and its 
instructors. 
The pressures placed on a recruit during the first week of R TC, according to 
Goffman (1961), challenge four areas of their lives. These pressures influence their 
understanding and acceptance of themselves as civilians. This provides a foundation for, 
and a reinforcement of their concept of self: (1) autonomy of action (self-determination, 
responsibility for own behavior, feeling relatively free to express themselves and to make 
choices); (2) personal economy of motion (freedom of spontaneous movement); (3) privacy 
(Physical and mental privacy); (4) a picture of themselves as a physical person (choice of 
clothing, degree of neatness, demeanor). 
Outcomes of Goffman's observations are apparent in today's recruit. RTC must 
deal with many emotional and societal barriers to training and transforming recruits to meet 
their mission requirement. Some of those emotional barriers are: loneliness, separation 
anxiety, depression, removal from civilian "comfort zone," inability to deal with a new 
environment, feelings of "not fitting in," and the "unknown" (Goffinan, 1961). Table 1 
shows the societal barriers to training at R TC based on pre-service profile data. 
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Table 1. Social Barriers to Training at RTC 
Social Barrier Percentage of Recruits 
Sexual, Emotional, or Physical Abuse 40 
Victim or Perpetrator of Extreme Violence 25 
Observer of Extreme Violence 14 
Contemplated Suicide 40 
Source: RTC Bnef to Secretary of Defense Cohen, September 1997 
A further point is that the civil-military relationship determines the type of people the 
Navy will recruit. Civilian attitudes and work ethic do not seem to be easily transformed 
into Navy attitudes and work ethic. RTC briefed Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in 
September of 1997 about fleet expectations of sailors graduating from RTC. Fleet 
expectations consisted of thirteen areas: 
1. Having a full seabag (required clothing issued at RTC) 
2. A working knowledge of core values (Honor, Courage, and Commitment) 
. 3. Meet Physical Readiness Standards 
4. Enthusiasm about their future in the Navy 
5. Arrive ready for duty (medical and dental readiness) 
6. Possess a healthy self-esteem 
7. Understand Navy Right and Responsibilities 
8. Be a recruiter 
9. Understand the What and Why of Zero Tolerance 
10. Succeed in a gender-neutral environment 
11. Possess basic military knowledge 
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12. Succeed in a multi-racial/cultural environment 
13. Possess orders 30 days prior to transfer 
Many of these fleet requirements are met through education and training, however, 
some areas such as enthusiasm, self-esteem, and succeeding in a multi-racial/cultural and 
gender-neutral environment may not be as easily instilled during training at RTC. 
In response to the societal barriers and culture, RTC has adopted a "gentler" boot 
camp. In an article by James Kitfield, "Boot Camp Lite," (February 1998), Recruit Division 
Commanders (RDCs) are the Navy's version of the "drill instructor." RDCs know that new 
recruits are expecting the Hollywood version of boot camp--in-your-face yelling and 
screaming, profanity, and an occasional boot to the backside-but it never comes. Instead 
the RDCs are firm but surprisingly patient and restrained in explaining exactly what the 
recruits can expect for the next nine weeks. The RDCs say, "We are the people you will 
. fear the most, but we are also the people that care about you the most. We want you to 
suce . We may yell at you, but no one is going to physically abuse you or call you 
name~ . (Kitfield, 1998:45) The RDC Creed is, "These recruits are entrusted to my care. I 
will train them to the best of my ability. I will develop them into smartly disciplined, 
physically fit, basically trained sailors. I will instill in them, and demonstrate by my own 
example, the highest standard of honor, courage and commitment" (RDC Training 
Manual: 1). "Breaking them down" and "building them back up" through trauma and 
terrorism is no longer considered appropriate for boot camp. 
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Kitfield explains three other factors that have contributed to the new RTC 
curriculum: (l) a desire to have a lower attrition rate in an increasingly difficult recruiting 
environment; (2) a desire to minimize personal abuse in a more racially and ethnically 
diverse military; and (3) the need to accommodate "Generation X" recruits, who are 
characterized as less physically fit and disciplined, yet smarter and more inquisitive then 
their predecessors (Kitfield, 1998). 
According to Admiral Green, Commander of Naval Training Center at Great Lakes, 
the Navy also discovered that the fear and intimidation model of leadership evident at RTC 
in the past was at odds with the fundamental culture in the fleet. Admiral Green said, "Why 
would you tram recruits and officers trainees with a model of leadership that you would 
never think of applying in the fleet? In the fleet, you're taught to value everyone you serve 
with, junior and senior, and you are all part of the same team. What's the matter with 
applying that model to boot camp, while still providing an environment that is very 
demanding emotionally, physically and mentally?" (Kitfield, 1998:48). 
Kitfield argues that RTC had to change because today's recruit is not a mirror of 
earlier generations. They reflect American youth at the end of the 20th century: radically 
and ethnically diverse, often the product of broken homes, computer literate but less 
physically fit than their predecessors. They represent the social strata that range from "farm 
kids to former gangbangers." As a result, RTC has found itself spending more time and 
effort teaching core values and ethics-topics RTC once took for granted (Kitfield, 1998). 
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Admiral Green states, "I'm afraid some of the old guard sometimes mistake their 
[new recruits in the fleet]· enthusiasm and inquisitiveness for: a lack of discipline. If we 
harness their tremendous enthusiasm, shape it, form it and put it to work for us, then I have 
no worries about the performance of our graduates [from NTC and RTC] in the fleet" 
(Kitfield, 1998:49). 
Changes to RTC's curriculum appear to be for social purposes and to meet 
endstrength requirements. High-ranking Navy leadership has required some of these 
changes while others have come from congressional inquiries; it may be that some of these 
changes have not addressed the needs of the fleet. 
E. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
Organizational configuration is a defmed as a "constellation of conceptually distinct 
characteristics that commonly occur together" (Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings, 1993). 
Configurations represent an organization's attributes such as its operating environment, 
strategy, structure, culture, beliefs, and processes. These attributes fall into a coherent 
pattern and create the organization as a whole. These attributes must cohere and be related 
in some stable and understandable way. 
Theoretical configurations are derived in two ways. Some are conceptually 
identified (Roberts, 1998) as ideal types based on apriori distinctions. Weber (1947) 
distinguished between traditional and bureaucratic types of org;anizations. Burns and Stalker 
(1961) compared organic and mechanistic forms of organizing. Other configurations are 
developed through empirical classification of data. Miller and Friesen (1984) used 
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statistical manipulation of organizational information to identify clusters of variables and 
their relationships in large organizational samples. 
There are two organizational dimensions that have consistently surfaced in 
organizational research: efficiency and effectiveness (Ostroff and Schmitt, 1993). 
Efficiency and effectiveness play an important role in organizational performance, however 
they compete for resources and can interfere with each other. Efficiency depends on focus, 
precision, repetition, analysis, discipline, rationale, and control (Handy, 1995). 
Effectiveness relies on serendipity, experimentation, novelty, free association, madness, 
loose discipline, and relaxed control. Effectiveness thrives on exploration and efficiency 
attempts to drive out exploration (Handy, 1995). 
According to Roberts' (1998) view of organizations, there are considered to be four 
types of organizational configurations: (1) Adaptive; (2) Directive; (3) PoliticallReactive; 
and (4) Generative. This paper concentrates on the first three configurations because they 
identify the types of configuration that recruits, RTC, and the fleet operate within. The 
fourth configuration-generative-has not been fully developed at the time of this thesis 
(Roberts, 1998). 
The adaptive configuration optimizes organizational effectiveness and collaboration. 
An organization that adapts to its external environment to achieve effectiveness and has 
little concern for efficiency is related to what one might find in a research and development 
organization. There is little direct authority-the general manager is a champion of 
innovation (Miles and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1996). Flexibility, creativity, exploration 
21 
and experimentation are far more important than rigid order and control. Roberts explains, 
"You can use this configuration to explain how children survive in today's society" 
(Roberts, 1998). In an adaptive society there is very little guidance in telling the individual 
how to think or act. This configuration may explain some of the attributes found in the "X-
Generation." Generally, today's new recruits may come from an adaptive configuration 
and are then forced into a directive configuration while at RTC. 
. The directive configuration optimizes efficiency and shows less concern for 
effectiveness. These organizations strive to run like well-oiled machines (Miles and Snow, 
1978; Mintzberg, 1996). These organizations focus on maintaining internal order and avoid 
external influences. There are fonnalized jobs and standardized work to maintain order and 
coordination. There are unifonn policies that cover rights and responsibilities, while 
promotions are based on competence and merit, and impersonal role relations ensure 
smooth workflow. The organization is designed with a top-down hierarchy and standard 
operating procedures. Most military commands and machine bureaucracies operate in a 
directive configuration where tasks are standardized, specialized, and fonnalized. The 
nonns in a directive configuration are order, stability, and respect for higher authority. 
In a political/reactive organization, the general manager does not strive toward 
efficiency or effectiveness. The general manager may act in response to effectiveness issues 
at one moment and then to efficiency issues the next. This creates a disjointed pattern of 
activity and is in response to the demands of a political environment. The general manager 
assumes the role of crisis manager who puts out the political fires as they start. General 
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managers may choose to join in the political atmosphere by building a power base to push 
their own agenda to satisfy their own self-interests. 
An example of the political/reactive configuration at RTC is indicated in an article 
by Admiral Green, Commander of Naval Training Center, Great Lakes (Green, 1997). RTC 
has changed its training program to keep the attrition rate-recruits that do not complete 
training-below 40 percent. Congressional inquiries and Naval Technical Training 
Reviews--outside influences-have driven many changes in RTC's curriculum. For 
example, the first day a recruit spends at R TC is a day of rest; not a day that leads to sleep 
deprivation as in the past. This change began with a congressional inquiry as requested by a 
parent whose child quit training only a few hours into the first day. These "outside 
influences," which are not controlled by RTC, have forced that organization to work in a 
political/reactive configuration. A political/reactive configuration (Roberts, 1998) consists 
of an organization that is reactive to the outside environment and makes changes to please 
political authority. The role of the Commanding Officer in such a configuration is that of a 
crisis manager while the staff essentially act as firefighters, putting out smaller emergent 
"fires" as they develop. 
R TC also works in a directive configuration where the organization is coordinated 
through hierarchical leadership and organized like a machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 
1996). In this configuration, the Commanding Officer is the strategic apex of the 
organization and in this role, sets the course with centralized decision making. 
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This mixture of political/reactive and directive configuration creates a difficult 
working environment (Roberts, 1998). In the political/reactive configuration, the leadership 
must attempt to satisfy conflicting stakeholders; i.e., Congress and the fleet, and is forced to 
compromise decision making based on the stakeholder with the strongest power base. The 
stakeholder with the strongest power base may well be Congress. Therefore, under the 
directive configuration, leadership must enforce new directions, or in the case ofRTC, new 
curriculum changes. As such, that may be in direct conflict to the RTC's mission: to 
prepare recruits to maintain fleet readiness. 
F. THE NAVY ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
The Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) provides the 
means by which all Navy enlisted personnel are classified to support training, advancement, 
and distribution of personnel within that classification system (The .Navy Manual of 
Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classification and Occupational Standards). 
A six-digit number identifies each Naval Standard. The first three digits identify the 
topic title, the fourth digit identifies the pay grade and the last two digits sequentially 
identify the specific Naval Standard within that pay grade. The Naval Standards for pay 
grade E-2 can be found in Appendix B. 
Transforming a civilian into a sailor is a difficult job with many complexities. 
Some difficulties in the transformation process may begin with the civil-military gap, which 
may lead to difficulties in recruiting the number of civili~s needed to maintain fleet 
readiness. RTC may need to alter training methodologies to lowering the attrition rate of 
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these difficult-to-find recruits. Also, the Navy must answer to Congress every year 
regarding training, manning, and readiness issues, which may influence curriculum changes 
at RTC. Training changes made at RTC, to ensure readiness is maintained, may not be 
conducive to fleet needs. 
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III. DATA AND METHODS 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
The thesis uses infonnation obtained through personal interviews and observation to 
explore the perceptions of General Detail (GENDET) personnel and their direct supervisors 
concerning training at Recruit Training Command (R TC) and its relevance to fleet 
expectations. Observations and interviews at RTC indicate the environment in which 
Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs) must train recruits and the goals ofRTC. Interviews 
with fleet GENDETs and their direct supervisors (Officers and Chiefs) were utilized for 
insight into fleet needs compared to the output of R TC. 
The sample is a diverse mixture of personnel, though they remain within the scope 
of the current study. Both enlisted men and women were interviewed at RTC and onboard 
ship. All officers interviewed were male. The total sample interviewed consisted of 54 naval 
personnel, including 48 enlisted personnel and six officers. The pay grade of the sample 
ranged from E-l (basic recruit) to 0-3 (Lieutenant). Table 2 describes the categories of the 
groups interviewed. Before each interview, the researcher provided a brief visual (see 
Figure 1.) and verbal overview of the nature of the topic and stressed the individual's right 
to privacy. 
Fonnal, structured intervie~s with recruits, Instructors, RDCs, and staff officers 
were conducted at Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes over the period 11-15 May 
1998. The sample of recruits (n= 14) ranged in age from 18 to 26 years of age and a variety 
of civilian backgrounds. The sample of RDCs (n= 18), classroom instructors (n=7) and staff 
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officers (n=3) at RTC Great Lakes came from a wide range of fleet ratings and held a 
variety of positions, (i.e., Quality Assurance, Command Assessment Team, Command 
Managed Equal Opportunity Advisor, and RDC Instructors), within the Recruit Training 
Command. The recruits in the interviews were selected based on availability, by the RTC 
staff and were on day 6-2 of their training, which indicates the sixth week, and·the second 
day of the that week of training. Two groups were interviewed, one from an all-female 
division and one group of males from an integrated division. 
Some RTC interviews were formally .scheduled and some were impromptu 
(discussing issues with recruits and RDCs in-transit from one part of RTC to another). A 
professional and relaxing atmosphere was established to put all respondents at ease in an 
attempt to elicit honest responses. Recruits were easy to put at ease in the formal 
interviews, however, those stopped in transit appeared to be nervous or upset emotionally 
(most thought they were in some sort of trouble because the researcher stopped then and 
was in uniform). All officers interviewed at RTC were of equal rank to the researcher (0-
3), while all other personnel were junior in rank (E-1 - E-8). The interview questions were 
open-ended to allow the respondents to discuss tangential subjects, if they desired. The 
questions asked of each group are shown in Appendix A. Occasionally, probing questions 
were required during the interview process to clarify a point made by the respondent. 
Formal interviews with GENDETs, division officers and chiefs were conducted on 
the USS Juneau (LPD-10), USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), 
respectively. Shipboard interviews were conducted 22-24 June 1998 in San Diego, CA. All 
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shipboard interviews were conducted in a private room aboard each ship. The fleet sample 
consisted of First Lieutenant Division Officers (n=3), Deck Division Chiefs (n=3) and 
GENDETs (n=6). 
Table 2. Description of Sample Groups 
Group Description Pay grade Number 
1 Recruits E-l to E-2 14 
2 Recruit Division Commanders E-5 to E-8 18 
3 RTC Staff Officers 0-3 3 
4 R TC Classroom Instructors E-5 to E-7 7 
5 GENDETs E-l to E-3 6 
6 Division Officers 0-2 3 
7 Division Chiefs E-7 3 
The Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) for pay grade E-2 
was used for comparative analysis of naval standards to RTC curriculum content. Career 
fields are not addressed, however, the standard knowledge and skills required for all 
. personnel in pay grade E-2 are used. These basic knowledge and skill requirements are 
Naval Standards. Naval Standards refer to those minimal capabilities, which the Navy 
expects and requires of individuals within each rate and rating. Standards are expressed in 
terms of task statements (duties and responsibilities) and they represent the abilities, 
knowledge, and skills needed to accomplish those tasks, duties and responsibilities. These 
Naval Standards form the basis for implementing and supporting actions for recruit training, 
military requirements training, and advancement. 
The researcher contrasted RTC's curriculum against NEOCS for pay grade E-2 to 
determine course content at RTC. Appendix B contains the standard knowledge and skill 
requirements for enlisted personnel in pay grade E-2. 
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B. DATA ANALYSIS AND THEME DEVELPOMENT 
The interview data were content analyzed to identify the perceptions and 
experiences of GENDET sailors regarding requirements in the fleet compared to the 
training received at RTC. Salient descriptive themes were developed within each group. 
These themes are presented in Chapter IV with supporting excerpts. 
To evaluate RTC's course content with respect to naval standards, the researcher 
used the naval standard skills and knowledge requirements for an enlisted person in pay 
grade E-2. The skills and knowledge listed in NEOCS were cross-referenced to course 
content at RTC contained in the Recruit Trainee Guide (1998) and the Recruit Training 




Chapter IV, Results, summarizes eight main themes concerning fleet expectations 
and training at RTC, which emerged from the data described in the previous chapter. The 
themes represent the perceptions of current fleet requirements at the GENDET level 
compared to current training at RTC. The themes are illustrated by quotations from the 
interviews. The number in parentheses (e.g., # 4) identifies the interviewee and the 
corresponding data sheet and transcript of the interview. No names were provided to 
maintain individual anonymity. The eight themes are divided in two sections, first by fleet 
interviews and then by RTC interviews and observations. Because the number of 
interviewees is small, the themes should be considered preliminary within the context of 
exploratory research. . Following the themes is a comparative analysis of the RTC 
curriculum and NEOCS. 
B. THEME I: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND 
DIVISION CIDEFS THINK THAT MOST GENDETS LACK COMMITMENT 
AND A STRONG WORK ETmC 
The theme was consistent throughout all the interviews with shipboard officers and 
chiefs. The officers perceived new GENDET sailors only wanted to work to minimum 
requirements and not conduct any work beyond what they are told. 
A Lieutenant Junior Grade (# 3) stated: 
GENDE:rs seem to feel proud to make it to work on time or show up for 
duty as required. They tend to think of their work as being in the way of 
their social life. They don't understand an honest day's work for honest 
day's pay. 'Do the minimums and get out of here.' 
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A Chief(# 3) stated: 
I know it is something that you grow up with, but I wish there were a 
way to start instilling a work ethic in boot camp. Do they teach them 
'attention to detail' any more? 
One Chief(# 2) stated: 
Part of the core values is commitment. Commitment must be to oneself 
and to the team or ship. This part of commitment is not being taught at 
RTC. 
Based on the Recruit Trainee Guide (March 1998), commitment is defmed as, "The 
day-to-day duty of every man and woman in the Department of the Navy is to join together 
as a team to improve the quality of our work, our people, and ourselves."(p. 110). One part 
of the creed to commitment is to, "Exhibit the highest degree of moral character, 
professional excellence, quality and competence in all that I do."(p. 110). Recruits are 
taught ~s lesson, however it does not appear to be emphasized throughout RTC training, as 
it does not appear to be internalized by the time recruits enter the fleet. Core values 
instruction is conducted in the classroom during day of training (DOT) 1-2 and again at 
DOT 8-1. (In DOT the fIrst number represents the week of training and the second number 
represents the day in that week of training). 
C. THEME n: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND 
DIVISION CIDEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS LACK PRIDE IN 
OWNERSIDP 
The theme was not as prevalent on newer ships (less than 4 years old). The newer 
ship (Arleigh Burke Class) is on her second Commanding Officer and there are still three 
"plank-owners" onboard. A plank-owner is a person that was assigned to the ship when it 
was newly commissioned. 
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The officers and chiefs onboard the older ships (ships 9 to 29 years old) perceive the 
problem of pride in ownership as a social issue that stems from how children are raised in 
today's society. Perhaps it stems from the point that GENDET sailors on older ships have 
not seen the true defInition of 'clean' compared to those GENDET sailors doing the same 
job on a much newer ship. Clean is defmed as conducting preventative maintenance, which 
ensures no rust or dirt on the equipment being maintained. 
A Chief(# 3) stated: 
Being on a newer ship like this is like buying a new car. You can 
smell the newness and want to maintain that new smell as long as you can. 
These sailors understand what new looks like and if they keep the ship 
looking new then their job is easier in the long run. The supervisors (E-4 to 
E-5) have real attention to detail and are trying to teach that to our newer 
sailors. Attention to detail leads to pride in ownership. 
A Chief (# 2) stated: 
I have been attached to many commands over the years and have 
never had such a difficult time trying to get deck seamen to do their jobs 
beyond the minimum, they just want to do the minimum and get off the 
ship. Their personal lives are more important than this ship. This ship is 
their home for the next four years and they don't seem to care about it. They 
lack attention to detail. I learned attention to detail in boot camp and it 
seems that they (R TC) have stopped teaching that. 
The officers and chiefs of the older ships think their E-4 and E-5 supervisors had to 
learn attention to detail in their training and were excellent at teaching the GENDETs about 
attention to detail. This indicates there may be a learning curve and attention to detail 
needs to be taught. 
RTC teaches a classroom lesson on professionalism on DOT 2-1. This lesson topic 
explains accountability for actions and inaction. This lesson topic also addresses 
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responsibility to the team, ship, Navy and the United States. The lesson topic on 
professionalism also discusses leadership and followership. The professionalism lesson 
topic indicates that RTC attempts to educate recruits on fleet expectations, but it may be 
that the topic can not be fully understood without hands-on experience, such as, conducting 
actual preventative maintenance on a ship's system. 
D. THEME III: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND 
DIVISION CIDEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS LACK RESPECT TOWARD 
AUTHORITY 
The theme was evident on all three ships. GENDET lack of respect was focused 
toward the chain of command, the ship, authority, and rules. It was unanimous across all 
three ships that'the worst offenders of this theme were in the minority, however. 
A LTJG (# 2) stated: 
One in ten GENDETs show gross disrespect toward the chain of 
command, the ship, authority, andlor rules. I discharged one for gross lack 
of respect toward the chain of command and I am about to discharge another 
for disrespect toward the ship, he tried to break some equipment instead of 
cleaning it. 
GENDETs were disrespectful in different areas--disrespect toward their peers and 
immediate supervisors and disrespect toward the ship's rules for safety. 
A LTJG (# 1) stated: 
Those that check onboard with a bad attitude are in the minority. 
We do our best to steer them in the right direction, but we are not always 
successful. Those who resist our guidance are usually discharged. 
Other evidence occurred when one chief explained how a GENDET greeted his 
Division Officer upon initial introduction, "Hey, man. What's up?" The chief goes on to 
explain that he sees many young sailors ducking for cover when morning or evening colors 
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are played so they don't have to salute or stand at attention. He feels this is a distinct lack 
of respect for the American flag and the country. 
R TC attempts to teach recruits about respect for authority and the nation on a daily 
basis. The RDCs are in command and a chain of command is established among the 
recruits-Recruit Chief Petty Officer, Recruit Petty Officer, Master at Arms, and a Recruit 
Administrative Petty Officer. Recruits are taught to use this chain of command, but not 
necessarily to respect those in the chain of command. The RDCs are respected because they 
are the only "defined" authority figures and have the power to discipline. 
E. THEME IV: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND 
DIVISION CIDEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS DO NOT UNDERSTAND 
TEAMWORK 
The officers and chiefs noticed that some of today's GENDETs do not work well 
with others. Some of these GENDETs have their own idea of how their job should be 
completed without regard to those working on the same team. 
A Chief(# 2) stated: 
These kids (GENDETs) are very individualistic. They do not like to 
work as a team. They think they know the best way to get the job done and 
they have very limited experience. I am shocked how they don't work well 
together. I always have an E-5 or E-6 supervising a group to make sure 
hostilities stay down to a low roar. 
Lack of teamwork can lead to a disaster when conducting line hanq.iing or underway 
replenishment operations. Being part of the team also implies watch standing. If one 
person on a watch team is not properly standing watch, then disaster could strike and cause 
grave damage to the ship or the crew. 
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According to one Chief(# 1): 
RTC must not teach the value of teamwork. When these kids 
(GENDETs) check onboard they expect personal space and individual 
attention; maybe that is from their upbringing. They are used to doing things 
on their own. I try to show them the big picture on why teamwork is so 
important, but not many want to buy into it. 
RTC teaches teamwork in the classroom, in labs, and as part of a recruit's daily 
routine. The RTC Recruit Trainee Guide (March 1998) explains watch standing as a team 
member and as an individual. Recruits are required to stand watches throughout their 
training. Marlinespike is a teamwork -oriented lab where recruits practice line-handling 
techniques. Drill or marching is also considered a teamwork event. Marching is a daily 
occurrence and one of the few modes of transportation while at RTC. There are the 
Seamanship Olympics, which compare one division's seamanship and teamwork skills 
against those of another division. In order to be successful in these events, recruits must 
. learn to communicate and work as a team. 
RTC stresses teamwork during a recruit's daily routine however, teamwork may be 
a foreign concept to many recruits and may not be easily learned. Chapter II, the Literature 
Review, explained how today's family environment and norms are very different from 
those in the Navy. A large percentage of single-parent families and dual-income families in 
today's society may lead to an environment of self-preservation for the children. Self-
preservation implies primary concern for one's own survival. Individual survival entails 
making decisions that affect only one and not others. These individualistic norms may be 
difficult to change. It is unknown to the researcher if the problem of teamwork should be 
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considered a training, leadership, or societal issue, however, it is an important area of 
concern for those in the fleet. 
F. THEME V: RTC STAFF WORKS IN A POLITICALIREACTIVE 
CONFIGURATION AS AN ORGANIZATION 
The political/reactive configuration (Lindblom, 1959; 1979) is characterized by an 
organization that bases its decision-making on politics or political authority. The 
organization tasks or jobs are fluid and determined by associations. Implementation of 
objectives lacks coherence among organizational parts and responsiveness to political 
authority is the norm. The main role of a General Manager-in this case the Commanding 
Officer-is crisis management. 
The political/reactive configuration concentrate their efforts on crisis management 
appears evident at the staff level in the daily operations of RTC. Staff personnel are 
responsible for ensuring the training guides are current based on congressional inquiries and 
less on fleet feedback. 
RTC staffLT (# 1) stated: 
I spend most of my time responding to congressional inquiries about our 
training methods and content. Many times the curriculum changes due to 
these inquiries. We seldom get a chance to look at what we need to include 
in the curriculum or instructor guides because we are always reacting to 
everyone else. Sometimes I feel like I work in a fishbowl. 
It appeared that some' new training guidelines are implemented without a pilot 
program and solely on the request of a congressperson. 
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An RDC Chief (# 8) stated: 
We were told by a congressman to start marching with rifles again 
because it would build discipline in today's young sailor. So the command 
(R TC) spent a half a million dollars on rifles with the firing pin removed. 
Then we realized we needed security for the rifles when they were not being 
used. The rifles were stored in these racks (in the division spaces), which 
cost another half a million dollars. We had to add another recruit to the 
division watch bill to meet the requirements of the two-man rule. This 
meant more recruits were missing out on training because they were in the 
division spaces. 
All of this money was spent without looking into a pilot program to see if 
marching with rifles would benefit the recruits and no one looked into the 
security issues, we just did it. What a waste of money, marching with rifles 
lasted 6 months and we stopped because of the logistic nightmares and lack 
of value-added training. 
The RDC Excellence Award Program is designed to recognize RDCs for sustained 
superior leadership, professionalism and accomplishment in training recruit divisions. This 
program has come under scrutiny by some RDCs because of the difficulty in achieving this 
milestone. The RDC's perforrhance is dependent on how well their division performs and 
the RDCs ability to counsel and ensure recruits meet medical and dental appointments. 
Division performance is based on academics, disciplinary and physical fitness setbacks or 
failures, and the number of compartment and street infractions or individual 'chits' the 
division receives during training. Chits are taken from recruits when another RDC or staff 
officer has noticed an infraction. The chit is processed into the division database and 
returned to the RDC for action. Because "pulling chits" goes against an IDC's points for 
the RDC Excellence Award, it is not uncommon for an RDC to 'pull' chits on other 
divisions and then spend every possible minute with their own division to avoid having 
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their 'chits pulled.' This tactic may be used to ensure minimal points lost for an RDC's 
division while attempting to maximize point loss for other RDCs. This type of "gaming" is 
considered not in the spirit of recruit training and possibly goes against the mission ofRTC. 
An RDC E-6 (# 14) stated: 
I like the idea of the RDC excellence award program, but I do not like the 
process. It entices RDCs to 'game the system' and try to bring down other 
RDCs. 
An RDC Chief(# 2) stated: 
RDCs spend too much time trying to win a personal award. They' game 
the system' instead of really training the r~cruits. If a recruit does not march 
well, the RDC ensures he/she has a medical appointment when their division 
is being inspected for drill excellence. I think the RDC excellence award 
program has tainted actual RDC performance and abilities. 
RTC trains recruits in a directive configuration, where there is a hierarchical chain 
of command within each division, the RDC is the strategic apex with a top down flow of 
information for efficiency (Miles and Snow, 1978), and controls for conduct are based on 
rules and regulations. Though recruit training is conducted in a directive configuration, 
RTC-as an organization-appears to operate in a political/reactive configuration. RDCs 
work in both configurations, which, according to Roberts (1998), leads to a very unhealthy 
working environment. An RTC Command Climate Survey (November, 1997) was given to 
the entire Recruit Training Command. This implies that all RDCs, instructors, staff, and 
support personnel were surveyed. A statement under the category Job Characteristics and 
sub-category Situational Constraints appears to reflect a political working environment 
based on responses to the statement, "Work surroundings get in the way of getting the job 
done." The responses to the statement ranged from "1= strongly disagree" to "6= strongly 
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agree." A mean score of 4.57 (s= .79) (n= 400) to this statement indicate that most 
respondents tend to agreed with the statement. The response to this statement may indicate a 
political work environment as a constraint to job performance. 
The two political environments the RDCs work under may constrain them from 
producing the best possible sailors for the fleet. The first political environment is that of the 
leadership at R TC. The leaders of R TC appear to make curriculum changes the based on 
outside influences-congressional inquiries and Naval Technical Training Reviews-and 
not necessarily on inputs from the fleet or the RDCs. These decisions are forced upon the 
RDCs in a directive environment. The RDC is the strategic apex for the division and may 
feel that some curriculum changes are not worth emphasizing, this could be a detriment to 
the overall quality training of the recruits. The second political environment is 
. political/reactive, which appears to stem from the RDC Excellence Award Program. The 
Excellence Award Program may force some RDCs to 'game the system' instead of 
challenging all of the recruits to do their best for the division. 
Admiral Green (1997) stated in his own article, "Building Sailors Better," about 
changes in RTC' s training curriculum, "In recent years, attrition was skyrocketing and far 
too many recruits were resorting to dangerous--often self-destructive-behavior," because 
of the isolation and intimidation of boot camp. This statement is indicative of decision-
making based on external influences. RTC changed its curriculum to lower attrition and to 
meet the perceived needs oftoday's youth. 
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G. THEME VI: RTC CONCENTRATES A LARGE PORTION OF TRAINING 
ON MILITARY DRILL 
RTC is designed to educate and train recruits in technical, military, physical, and 
uniform reqUirements. The RTC Master Training Schedule (May 1998) indicates a 
majority of training time at RTC is devoted to military drill. There are approximately 803 
hours of training time allotted in the recruit training timetable, and 733 hours allotted for 
health and comfort. Health and comfort comprises sleep, meals, medical and dental 
processing, haircuts, holiday routine each Sunday-attend religious services, write and read 
letters, work on uniforms, lounge, shower, and other personal items. Recruit training time 
comprises 52 percent of a recruit'stotal time at RTC with 48 percent devoted to health and 
comfort. Of the total recruit training time, approximately 16 percent is devoted to technical 
training (classroom/lab). Miscellaneous military training consumes approximately 15 
percent of the training time. RDC training-ensuring recruits daily and evening routines are 
completed and additional recruit training in any area the RDC feels the division needs extra 
work-is 33 percent of the training time. Military drill consumes 23 percent of the training, 
military uniform training consumes 4 percent of the training, and approximately 9 percent 
of the training time is dedicated to physical training. (See Figure 2 for a graphic 
representation of the components of recruit training time.) 
RDC time and drill time are separate timetables. Approximately one-third of the recruits' 
training timetable is dedicated to RDC time. The RDC is given the flexibility to train the 
divisions as he or she desires without the aid of an Instructor Guide. This suggests RDC 
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training time topics and instruction may be non-standardized. RDC time may be used for 





















questions. Much of the time is devoted to preparing the division for one of four classroom 
tests or one of three drill inspections. 
A recruit (#14) stated: 
It is obvious that the RDCs are trying to win the drill flag to make 
themselves look good. Why don't we spend more time learning about the 
Navy and less time marching around for their personal gratification? They 
(RDCs) could teach us so much more about the Navy and what to expect 
when we go to the fleet or our follow-on schools, but they would rather have 
us march. 
A GENDET (# 4) stated: 
There was a lot of down time during boot camp. We would have our 
schedule set and would hurry up to get to where we were supposed to be and 
then wait. We had our Trainee Guide with us all the time, but we were not 
always required to study it unless we had a test coming soon. We spent a lot 
of time being quiet or practicing drill. We could have been learning 
something else that would have helped us in the fleet. 
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A GENDET (# 6) stated in reference to all the time spent on drill: 
I just came from boot camp three months ago. I was not prepared for the 
physical readiness test (PRT) last month. I think boot camp needs to add 
more physical training .. 
A recruit (# 7) stated: 
I thought I would get more physical training. My dad is a retired chief 
and he told me about all the physical training he went through (in boot 
camp), so I prepared for that and it isn't happening. I think more physical 
training would be better than more marching. I think getting physically fit 
builds self-esteem. 
RDCs concentrate RDC time on drill through the seventh Saturday of training-
Pass-In-Review and final drill evaluation. 
An RDC E-6 (# 16) stated: 
Winning the drill flag and academic flag is a morale booster for the 
division. There is also an incentive for the RDCs to win these flags because 
they gain points toward the RDC Excellence Award, which is very difficult 
to achieve. 
Many of the RDCs like the autonomy of using the RDC time, as they desire. 
An RDC E-6 (# 12) spoke for the majority of the RDCs by stating: 
I have pushed four divisions and none of them have been the same. Each 
one needed some kind of special attention. If we were stuck to a rigid 
schedule (RDC time) then we would be hard pressed to give each division 
special attention or enhanced training. You can't build an instructor guide 
for each division's individual needs. 
It appears RDCs enjoy the autonomy of flexible training during RDC training time. 
Recruits feel that RDC time is used more for a self-serving purpose by the RDC. Much of 
the RDC time is spent preparing the recruits for written exams and practicing military drill. 
H. THEME VTI: RTC IS DESIGNED AS A SOCIALIZATION PROCESS 
One ofRTC's critical inherent functions is developing patterns of human behavior. 
RTC's training philosophy (Recruit Training Command Brief, 1997) is to make responsible 
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change, understand the adult learning process, instill core values, develop warriors, and 
build self-discipline. To enhance the training philosophy, RTC has developed some "Tools 
for Success." These tools include programs to assist recruits in educational deficiencies and 
behavioral skills. 
Fundamental Applied Skills Training (FAST) is designed to improve recruits' oral 
communications skills. FAST is available to recruits if English is their second language, or 
they scored a 42 or less on their verbal composite score (VE), which is the composite score 
of word knowledge and paragraph comprehension portion of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASV AB). The mean score for VE (ASV AB Test Manual 
1984) is 52.88 with a standard deviation of6.37. Reading comprehension training is used to 
increase literacy and to understand Navy vocabulary. Also, under the FAST program are 
study techniques to improve academic performance for recruits who fail the same test two 
times. 
FAST is needed with the ethnic diversity of the United States and the difficulty in 
recruiting those with the highest ASV AB scores. 
An RDC Chief(# 7) stated: 
I have a recruit from Zimbabwe, and one from Spain~ They speak: very 
little English and I send them both to FAST. They are learning quickly, but 
have difficulty understanding Navy slang. You can see the curiosity in their 
eyes when I use Navy slang; they need a lot of attention. 
Personal Applied Skills Streaming (PASS) is designed for those recruits who refuse 
to train, have suicide ideation, disruptive behavior, low self-esteem, lack motivation, have 
problems dealing with authority, need anger management, or are unable to deal with 
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cultural diversity. PASS is an important tool for RTC since 40 percent of recruits' pre-
service profiles (1997) include contemplation of suicide, sexual, emotional, or physical 
abuse, and 64 percent of recruits have been exposed to extreme violence in the form of 
being a victim, perpetrator, or observer. The PASS course assists recruits in dealing with 
emotional barriers to learning and gives recruits enhanced coping skills to enable them to 
function in the fleet. 
An RDC E-5 (# 9) stated: 
Some of these kids bring a lot Of extra baggage with them. I don't know 
why they are being recruited or how they are making it through the 
screening process. We spend a lot oftime trying to fix their social problems. 
RTC curriculum consists of classes to deal With expected behavior. Classes such as 
discrimination, sexual harassment/fraternization, rape awareness, Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, professionalism, and core values are indicative of behavioral expectation in the 
navy. These rules and regulations about behavior may not have been addressed to recruits 
while in the civilian sector and may be foreign. These are essential areas of education to 
assist the fleet in managing new tecruits and their behaviors. 
I. THEME VIII: RTC PREPARES RECRUITS FOR THE FLEET THROUGH 
SOCIALIZATION AND EDUCATION; THE FLEET WANTS SAILORS THAT 
FOLLOW ORDERS AND WORK HARD 
In analyzing formal and informal interview responses and determining the first 
seven themes, it appeared there were two overriding themes. These two themes: RTC 
prepares recruits for the fleet through socialization and education, and the fleet wants 
followers and workers, shows a possible disparity between R TC output and the needs of the 
fleet. 
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It is important to realize that socialization and education are important for 
introductory training. Theme VI, "RTC is Designed as a Socialization Process," is 
important for the recruit to make a smoother transition from civilian life to the fleet. 
Socialization and education prepare recruits for the fleet and follow-on training as part of 
RTC's mission. RTC attempts to instill Navy culture in recruits while in an isolated 
environment. The training methodology is through direct communication-classroom 
instruction-and indirectly through a recruit's daily interaction within the division. Separate 
courses such as PASS and FAST help prepare some recruits for the fleet by enhancing their 
learning and coping skills. Classroom topics such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
discrimination, rape awareness, core values, sexual harassment/fraternization, and 
professionalism assist recruits in understanding the new rules and regulations they are 
expected to work under, and the values and norms expected of them in the fleet. 
Themes I, III, and IV (p. 31, 34, and 35, respectively) indicate that a valued part of 
Navy culture is not being learned at RTC; i.e., working hard, respect for authority, and 
teamwork. At R TC, a few recruits are put in positions of authority within their respective 
divisions: Recruit Chief Petty Officer, Recruit Petty Officer, Recruit Division 
Administrative Petty Officer, Recruit Training Petty Officer, and the Recruit Master at 
Arms. These recruits are normally picked for these positions based on their maturity, 
education, past civilian and/or military experience, and in the case of the Master at Arms, 
physical size. There appears to be a lack of hands-on training at RTC for all recruits to 
personally experience hard work, respect for authority, and teamwork. Being in a position 
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of authority may be a valuable learning experience for the recruits to teach respect and the 
value of teamwork. 
According to Theme II, (p. 32), the fleet wants workers with pride in ownership. 
RTC produces, in the eyes of those interviewed in the fleet, "kids without drive or 
discipline." Fleet ~ivision officers and chiefs agree that new sailors need to internalize self-
pride, pride in ownership, work ethic, and respect. However, self-pride, pride in ownership, 
and work ethic do not appear to be taught at RTC. According to the researcher, RTC could 
enhance self-pride by making boot camp more challenging from the very beginning. One 
GENDET said, "being in the fleet is much harder than being in boot camp." Perhaps RTC 
may need to create an atmosphere of "needing to belong" instead of "needing to just get 
by." Perhaps this is a point to consider in future RTC decisions. 
J. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RTC TRAINING CURRICULUM WITH 
NAVY ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS SYSTEM 
A comparative analysis indicated that 74 percent of the standards (n= 174) required 
in the NEOCS was addressed in the RTC curriculum. However, there were 15 
discrepancies between the NEOCS requirement for E-2 and the RTC curriculum that may 
need to be addressed and implemented in recruit training. Other knowledge and skill 
discrepancies between RTC and NEOCS should be addressed at the fleet leveL The six-
digit code for each of the 15 discrepancies isbolded in Appendix B. Each of the 
discrepancies is noted below and discussed briefly. 
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The 15 discrepancies noted between RTC curriculum and NEOCS were (code/skill or 
knowledge): 
1. 902202: Procedures for locating and reporting an object by relative bearing and 
position angle. 
2. 903201: Individual positions and facings without anns. 
3. 911217: Purpose, use and procedures of the Navy tag out system. 
4. 911218: Safety procedures to follow when lifting objects. 
5. 921207: Conditions that cause spontaneous combustion. 
6. 921210: Shipboard piping identification coding system. 
7. 921216: Identification of damage control lockers and use of contents. 
8. 921217: Methods and procedures for communications in a damage control 
situation. 
9. 922201: Cleaning and stowing of painting equipment. 
10. 922202: Purpose for cleaning and preservation. 
11. 922203: Equipment, methods and procedures for preparing and painting a 
surface. 
12.922204: Methods and procedures for preserving surfaces not to be painted. 
13. 941214: Purpose of professional development board. 
14. 941218: Dependents rights, privileges and benefits. 
15. 942201: Personnel qual~fication standards (PQS) system. 
The first discrepancy: procedures for locating and reporting an object by relative 
bearing and position angle, is knowledge required by all sailors who stand lookout watches. 
Watch standing entails clear communication. In order for a lookout watch stander to 
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communicate clearly, he or she must understand how to communicate vital lookout 
information to other personnel on watch. This entails procedures for locating and reporting 
objects by relative bearing and position angle. 
The second discrepancy: individual positions and facings without arms, appears to 
be over-emphasized at RTC.1t was noted in Theme VI that much of the RDC training time 
was devoted to military drill, above that already devoted by the curriculum to military drill 
(see Figure 2). It appears to the researcher that an inordinate amount of time is being 
diverted to military drill when much of the RDC time or military drill time could possibly 
be used in other areas of training. 
Purpose, use and procedures of the Navy "tag out" system was the third 
discrepancy. The tag out system is the first step in conducting any maintenance function. 
The person conducting maintenance "tags" the electrical source and the equipment as 
'under repair' so others do not inadvertently apply power to that equipment while it is being 
maintained. Most new sailors will be part of the ship's maintenance team either directly or 
indirectly. The "tag out" system was designed as a safety system to save lives and should 
be emphasized at RTC and all schools leading to the fleet. 
Because of the physical aspect of being a sailor, RTC should emphasize proper 
lifting techniques. Fleet sailors in pay grades E-3 and below are normally used for 
underway replenishment and preparing the ship for deployment. It should be noted that a 
ship is not always a stable platform for lifting and carrying objects and safety is of grave 
concern when conducting these activities. Some sailors' daily maintenance routine will 
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involve lifting objects some considered heavy under at-sea conditions. Strains from lifting 
objects become a readiness issue. There are posters on the walls of RTC about lifting 
techniques, but no formal education. 
The fifth item: conditions that cause spontaneous combustion, is very important 
since all sailors live and work in confined areas aboard ship. Aspects that lead to 
spontaneous combustion should be addressed at RTC and in follow-on schools leading to 
the fleet. Fire and explosions are a ship's worst enemy. 
The sixth area of concern for training at RTC is the shipboard piping identification 
coding system. This is basic knowledge that all sailors should have before assignment to 
the fleet. This knowledge is especially helpful to sailors attached to a damage control team 
and is needed for drills and actual emergencies. It is unclear to the researcher how much, if 
any, of this information is taught prior to Battle Stations, a damage control simulation 
conducted on day of training 7-4. 
Items seven and eight deal with damage control: identification of damage control 
lockers and use of contents and methods and procedures for communications in a damage 
control situation. These areas are covered in brief at R TC to prepare recruits for their final 
stage of training, Battle Stations. This is a hands-on training experience, however it is the 
type of training that should be emphasized for shipboard survival. 
Items nine through twelve deal with surface preservation. The issue of surface 
preservation is not covered at RTC and will become a task for many new sailors upon 
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joining the fleet. Fleet readiness may be enhanced-less training time needed in the fleet-
if this topic were addressed at RTC, especially for the GENDET sailors. 
Items thirteen and fourteen pertain to professional development. Professional 
development is taught at R TC, however two areas-purpose of the professional 
development board and dependent rights, privileges and benefits-are not included in the 
classroom seminars. It is important for a new sailor to understand what the professional 
development board is designed for. This may help sailors better understand the 
performance characteristics expected of them in the fleet. 
Another item of concern is that recruits should be informed about their dependents' 
rights and benefits since a large number of sailors are either single parents, married, or plan 
to get married soon after R TC graduation. 
The last possible discrepancy in training at RTC is about a system that all sailors 
will use to qualify for various duties. The personnel qualifications standard (PQS) system is 
used by all sailors in qualifying for watch standing, job qualification, and warfare specialty 
training. The PQS system is a self-study booklet that guides sailors to subjects that are 
required knowledge, skills, and abilities that they must be proficient in for their current duty 
assignment. It is important to understand the workings of the PQS system and how to best 
use the system for qualification. Many new sailors are handed a PQS book and told, with 
little guidance, to "go study and come back when you know it." Because all sailors will use 
this system for qualification, and since it is the main method for most qualifications in the 
Navy, recruits should be introduced to it at RTC. A new curriculum, now in place at most 
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advanced schools, Navy Military Training uses the PQS system for sailors to qualify for 
watch standing and off-base liberty. 
Training at Apprentice Training Division (ATD) is two weeks long and covers 
advanced fire fighting and damage control. ATD teaches GENDETs about damage control 
lockers, and communications in a damage control situation, however, if recruits attend 
advanced schooling ("A" school), they do not learn about damage control until they join the 
fleet. 
K. SUMMARY 
The first four themes were derived from fleet interviews: (1) lack of commitment! 
work ethic; (2) lack of pride in ownership; (3) lack of respect for authority; and (4) lack of 
understanding about teamwork. Based on fleet interviews, the fleet considers these themes 
. as societal issues that RTC should address in their curriculum as part of the transformation 
process from civilian to sailor. 
Theme VII, RTC uses a socialization process in their curriculum, indicates part of 
the transformation process. R TC attempts to educate recruits on behavioral expectations in 
the Navy by teaching subject areas such as core· values, sexual harassment, fraternization, 
rape awareness, discrimination, professionalism, and Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
These are important areas of education in the transformation process and they meet RTC's 
critical function of developing certain patterns of behavior necessary for shipboard living 
and maintaining high standards of conduct expected of Navy service. 
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The societal issues faced by the fleet are not the same societal issues addressed at 
RTC. There appears to be support for theme VIII. Recruit training is focused on 
socialization and education based on themes from fleet interviews, the socialization process 
at RTC, and a comparative analysis between RTC curriculum and NEOCS for pay grade E-
2. It appears that RTC does not directly teach responsibility, work ethic, and pride in 
ownership. However, it appears RTC does attempt to teach teamwork and respect for 
authority. According to fleet interviews, RTC needs to address work ethic and pride in 
ownership and needs to improve their curriculum in the areas of teamwork and respect for 
authority. 
Theme VI, RTC spends a large portion of training time on military drill, may be 
inconsistent with NEOCS requirement 903201 where drill requirements consist of knowing 
individual positions and facing movements without arms. Up to 56 percent of recruits' 
training time at RTC may be dedicated to military drill; 23 percent of training time for 
military drill and 33 percent of training time for RDC training time. This is not to say that 
all of the RDC training time is spent on military drill, however, according to interviews 
conducted at RTC, much of the RDC's training time is used for additional military drill. 
This disparity in skills and knowledge appears to support recruits' perceptions that 
additional military drill is used for RDC gratification by attempting to win the drill flag. 
The political/reactive orgariizational configuration discussed in theme V may be the 
underlying cause for the other themes. It appears that RTC reacts quickly to political 
inquiries and Navy Technical Training Reviews concerning curriculum content. It also 
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appears that the curriculum at RTC is in a constant state of change with little fleet input. 
Reacting to influences outside of the organization, and constant change, are characteristic of 
the political/reactive configuration. This implies that the Commanding Officer might 
respond to issues of effectiveness at one moment, and efficiency the next in an effort to 
maintain a balance of mission accomplishment. This appears to be how RTC operates at 
the time of this study. 
Cultural change is difficult. The output from R TC, in the form of graduated 
recruits, creates a culture that will be imbedded in the fleet. This implies that RTC teaches 
individuals, (new recruits) who just recently left civilian life, about the Navy, dresses the 
recruits in the Navy uniform, and sends them to the fleet, without completely transforming 
their civilian culture to a Navy culture. There are many cultural changes or transformations 
that occur in recruits while at RTC, but not all recruits transform from civilian to military 
culture. 
In order for an organization's culture to change, the organizational configuration 
needs to change. However, it is very difficult for an organization to change its 
configuration. F or successful change in configuration, the organization, through the 
Commanding Officer, must change the organization's direction and/or the design factors of 
the organization. These steps take a concentrated effort and there must be a champion to 
the change. The champion to change in the military rests with the Commanding Officer, or 
change will not occur. 
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v. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The study examined the gap between training at Recruit Training Command (RTC) 
and the needs of the fleet based on perceptions and experiences of fleet Division Officers, 
Chiefs, and General Detail Sailors (GENDETs), RTC personnel and recruits, and the Navy 
Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS). Because GENDETs receive the 
least amount of training (two weeks) between completion of boot camp and joining the 
fleet, they were used as the target group to assess RTC effectiveness for meeting fleet needs .. 
The gap between training at RTC and the needs of the fleet is apparent from the analysis 
conducted for this research. RTC concentrates on transforming civilian social norms into 
Navy social norms. The fleet requires new sailors to work hard, have pride in ownership 
and self, and respect for authority. NEOCS indicates training deficiencies at RTC in the 
knowledge base needed for enlisted personnel in pay grade E-2. 
All interview participants were asked for their honest perceptions, and all were 
promised complete anonymity. It is with this understanding of the dynamics involved in 
questioning all personnel that the following themes emerged. 
• THEME I. FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND 
DIVISION CHIEFS THINK THAT MOST GENDETS LACK COMMITMENT 
AND A STRONG WORK ETHIC. 
• THEME II: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND 
DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS LACK PRIDE IN 
OWNERSHIP. 
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• THEME III: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND 
DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS LACK RESPECT 
TOWARD AUTHORITY. 
• THEME IV: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND 
DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS DO NOT UNDERSTAND 
TEAMWORK. 
• THEME V: RTC STAFF WORKS IN A POLITICALIREACTIVE 
CONFIGURATION AS AN ORGANIZATION. 
• THEME VI: RTC CONCENTRATES A LARGE PORTION OF TRAINING ON 
MILITARY DRILL. 
• THEME VII: RTC IS DESIGNED AS A SOCIALIZATION PROCESS. 
• THEME VIII: RTC PREPARES RECRUITS FOR THE FLEET THROUGH 
SOCIALIZATION AND EDUCATION; THE FLEET WANTS SAILORS THAT 
FOLLOW ORDERS AND WORK HARD. 
These themes are evaluated in terms of perceived views of personnel and recruits at 
RTC, fleet First Lieutenant Division Officers, Deck Division Chief Petty Officers, and 
Deck seamen (GENDET sailors). These themes are also analyzed based on comparative 
analysis of the RTC curriculum and NEOCS. 
RTC appears to work on transforming civilian values and ethics into Navy values 
and ethics; i.e., socialization. This transformational training is conducted in the classroom 
and is indirectly re-enforced on a daily basis. Recruits are also educated about the Navy, 
the chain of command, and rights and responsibilities, which is part of the socialization 
process. Perceptions from fleet sailors intervIewed are that RTC is not preparing recruits for 
service in the fleet or creating disciplined sailors. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
RTC's mission is to transfonn civilians into motivated and disciplined apprentice 
sailors and to prepare these recruits for follow-on training and service in the fleet. The data 
collected for this research suggest that R TC does not fully meet its mission with respect to 
preparing recruits for service in the fleet. This implies that R TC could incorporate different· 
training methodologies to help meet its mission. 
Some of the shortfalls in training at RTC may come from the fact that Recruit 
Division Commanders CRDCs) control 33 percent of recruits' training time, however, this 
time is not standardized. Some RDCs use this time to teach recruits about the Navy, and 
some RDCs use this time to prepare recruits for inspections and exams. Constant drilling 
and studying for exams is perceived by recruits as self-serving for the RDC. RDCs are 
. perceived as self-serving in this regard because the recruits think that winning drill, 
inspection, and academic honors is for RDC gratification, not for the division. The recruits 
consider they would rather leam more about the Navy, be physically challenged, and 
receive hands-on training to better prepare them for duty in the fleet. 
The recruits' training desires are echoed in the needs of the fleet. The fleet desires 
sailors with a strong work ethic, pride in ownership and self, and respect for authority. Fleet 
input for this study indicates that RTC is failing in these areas of trainihg. Fleet First 
Lieutenant Division Officers and Chiefs feel that RTC should teach "Navy pride" and work 
ethic as opposed to concentrating on lowering attrition. 
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In a sense, the role ofRTC is to transform the new recruits' existence in an adaptive 
organizational configuration to a directive configuration-which amounts to helping them 
adapt to a new culture. To change a recruit's culture, RTC must give recruits a new 
direction-mission and values-and a new set of design factors. Design factors (McCaskey, 
1979) include new tasks, technology, structure, people, and process/subsystems. RTC 
teaches new recruits about basic tasks and specifications of actions required in the Navy. 
This assists in the transformation of civilian culture to military culture. However, some 
technology, group working structures (other than chain of command), knowledge, skills, 
abilities, and military processes are not addressed in accordance with NEOCS. These issues 
must be part of the education, training, and day-to-day life of RTC, while maintaining 
characteristics, such as innovative thinking, to completely transform civilian culture into a 
Navy culture. 
RTC staff works in a political/reactive configuration. A political/reactive 
configuration consists of an organization that reacts to politics and is political (Lindblom, 
1979). There are competing external environments such as other military services, 
congresspersons, parents, economy, and civil-military relations. These external pressures 
drive planning, decision-making and change, such as the desire to keep attrition low, at 
RTC. There is a very dynamic training plan that is designed for educating recruits, however, 
planning changes to the curriculum is typically made in response to the external pressures. 
Curriculum decisidn-making is responsive to political authority or inquiry, not necessarily 
to the needs of the fleet. One RDC commented, "The only constant here is change." 
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Curriculum officers spend a majority of their time making curriculum changes or 
responding to congressional inquiries. One of the curriculum officers commented they were 
too busy trying to keep up with curriculum changes and did not have time to look at the 
actual training needs. Education specialists also spend much of their time ensuring the 
curriculum guides meet educational specifications required by the Chief of Naval Education 
and Training (CNET). 
R TC appears to have a possible dysfunctional reward system with respect to the 
RDC Excellence Award Program and the mission of the RDCs. The RDC Creed is, "These 
recruits are entrusted to my care. I will train them to the best of my ability. I will develop 
them into smartly disciplined, physically fit, basically trained sailors. I will instill in them, 
and demonstrate by my own example, the highest standard of honor, courage and 
commitment" (RDC Training Manual: 1). The difficulty in reaching the milestone of the 
RDC Excellence Award may taint some RDCs' abilities 'in training recruits and meeting the 
RTCs mission by "gaming the system" to gain this award. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
RTC does an excellent job of instilling most military values into today's young 
sailor, considering RTC's difficult mission and the many inhibiting factors to success. 
However, according to the sample of Officers and Chiefs interviewed for this research, 
RTC's current curriculum is not meeting the needs of the fleet or the readiness goals of the 
Navy. 
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Additional research is recommended to gain a better understanding of how to best 
train young men and women to meet the needs of the fleet. It is possible that a longitudinal 
study tracking a larger number of GENDETs, with Division Officer and Chiefs' inputs on 
their performance, would yield more substantial results. Particular emphasis might be 
placed on specific factors associated with retention and attrition of recruits. Navy personnel 
who failed to complete their first term of enlistment should be queried as a means to 
possibly gain additional insights to RTC training and skills required while in the fleet. 
The following four recommendations may assist RTC in meeting their mission: 
1. Review NEOCS requirements for E-2 as a means to incorporate more 
hands-on training. 
Recruits may learn more skills applicable to the fleet working environment with 
more hands-on training. Incorporating a hands-on lab that teaches recruits 
about preventative maintenance and the Navy "tag out" system may also help 
build a better work ethic, pride in ownership, and team work. This type of 
hands-on training may assist in the transformation process from civilian to 
sailor by giving recruits a sense of the Navy's mission and values. 
2. All recruits should be put in a leadership role while at RTC. 
Another recommendation that might assist in the transformation process is to 
implement opportunities for hands-on practice in leadership. Requiring a 
recruit to be responsible for the division in meeting its daily routine and 
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answering to the RDC for any infractions may build respect toward authority, 
create an atmosphere of belonging, and enhance teamwork. 
3. Standardize some of the RDC training time. 
RDC training time composes 33 percent of recruit training. This training time is 
not standardized for RDCs. Nonstandard training may lead to adhoc training 
that is not relevant to recruit training or meeting RTC's mission. Some of the 
RDC training time may be used for hands-on training as suggested in 
recommendation number one. 
4. Review RDC Excellence Award Program 
There appears to be a "gaming of the system" by RDCs to receive the RDC 
Excellence Award. "Gaming" refers to how an RDC may ensure a less than 
average recruit is not present during an inspection. For example an RDC may 
ensure recruits, who are poor at marching, have medical or dental appointments 
on the day of a drill inspection. According to RDC interviews, the difficulty in 
reaching the milestone of the RDC Excellence Award may cause RDCs to focus 
less on enhancing the abilities of poor performing recruits. Instead, RDCs 
concentrate their efforts on ensuring those recruits are not available during 
inspections. Perhaps this award should be based less on the performance of the 
recruits and more on the performance of the RDC. Such changes in RDC 
performance measurement may bring a halt to "gaming the system" and allow 
those RDCs to concentrate their efforts on transforming civilians into sailors. 
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RTC is constrained by complex, external influences such as the civil-military gap, 
recruiting shortfalls, and the needs of the fleet. Because of these external influences, R TC 
is only partially accomplishing its mission of transforming civilians into motivated and 
disciplined sailors and preparing recruits for service in the fleet. There appears to be a 
training gap at RTC in preparing recruits for the fleet as indicated in the above 
recommendations. To better ensure RTC can accomplish this portion of their mission, they 
might investigate a process to receive timely and continual fleet feedback. Fleet feedback 
and an internal study of R TC's political/reactive organizational system design for 
incorporating curriculum changes may help R TC adjust their training methodologies to 
"build a better sailor" and enhance fleet readiness. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
General Ouestions for RTC 
1. What is the percentage of GENDETs that graduate per year/class? 
2. What percentage of time is committed to seamanship training? 
3. What percentage of time is committed to core value training? 
4. What percentage oftime is committed to "fleet survival" training? 
5. What percentage of time is committed to rights and responsibilities? 
6. What percentage oftime is committed to the transformation process? 
7. What is the most important area of trainiI?-g? 
8. How much free time is allowed per week/day? 
9. What is the percentage oftime spent in the classroom? 
10. What training is conducted on the weekends? 
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RTC Curriculum Officer Ouestions 
Background: 
Warfare Designator: Education: 
YOS: TimeatRTC: 
1. What is the main focus ofRTC training? 
2. How many curriculums do you control? 
3. How many changes have there been in your curriculum over the past 10 years? 
4. What changes have been made? 
5. Why were changes made? 
6. How are core values instilled in the recruits? 
7. What basic skills should a recruit graduate with? 
8. How much time is spent on learning Navy culture and how is it conducted? 
9. How has classroom training changed over the past 10 years? 
10. Why have changes occurred? 
11. How is the transfonnation process conducted? 
12. What feedback do you receive from the fleet? 
13. How do you receive the feedback? 
14. Are changes made to the curriculum based on the feedback? 
15. Who makes the changes to the curriculum? 
64 
16. What feedback do you receive from the recruits? 
17. How prepared are recruits for follow-on training? 




Rating: Yos: Number of courses taught: 
Previous duty station(s): Bootcamp experience: 
1. How much freedom do you have to discipline recruits? 
2. What are areas of discipline? 
3. How much physical training is conducted? 
4. How much training is dedicated to seamanship? 
5. How much time is dedicated to the transformation process? (Learning Navy and military 
culture/ decivilianizing/role-depossessing) . 
6. How much time is dedicated to understanding and living out Navy core values? 
7. How long does it take for recruits to internalize Navy core values during bootcamp? 
8. How long does it take for the transformation process to occur? 
9. How much time is dedicated to Navy traditions and customs? 
10. What feedback do you receive from the fleet? 
11. How do you receive fleet feedback? 
12. How much input do you have toward curriculum changes? 
13. How many free hours do the recruits have per day without instructor contact? 
14. How would you improve the RTC experience/training/educationlindoctrination process 
to better meet fleet requirements? 
15. What are the most important skills a new recruit needs to learn before graduation? 
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16. \\That would you like to add that you feel I should know to help me with my thesis? 
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RTC Instructor Questions 
Background: 
Rating: YOS: Number of courses taught: 
Previous duty station(s): Bootcamp experience: 
1. How much freedom do you have to discipline recruits? 
2. What are areas of discipline? 
3. How are classroom sessions conducted? 
4. Do recruits have a chance to study the content before class? 
5. How much freedom do you have for personalizing Instructor Guides? 
6. How many written tests are there? Is there one for each subject? 
7. How much freedom do you have for sea-stories? 
8. Do you feel the recruits learn enough in the classroom to be successful in the fleet? 
9. How many multi-mediums do you use? 
10. How much freedom do you have away from the I.G.? 
11. How is the communication flow in the classroom? 
12. How did Instructor School prepare you for this level of training? 
13. Explain the Instructor under training process. 
14. How many students do you instruct at one time? (On average) 
15. What would you like to add that you feel I should know to help me with my thesis? 
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GENDET/ATD Student Control Officer Ouestions 
Background: 
YOS Rank Job Time onboard Type ship 
1. How much time is devoted to re-enforcing core values, customs and traditions for 
GENDET sailors at this command? 
2. How much hold time is there for a GENDET during their 3 weeks of training? 
3. How much military interaction is there during training for GENDETS? 
4. How much GMT is there during a GENDET's time at ATD? 
5. How are core values, customs and traditions exhibited in the fleet? 
6. How important are Navy customs and traditions in this command? 
7. What traditions, learned in bootcamp, are least important in this command? 
8. How are core values, customs and traditions re-enforced in this command? 
9. How much influence does the CO have in shaping culture and core values in this 
command? 
Academics - individuals are carefully moved through training programs for career 
development 
Fortresses - individuals are asked to engage in a turnaround and a fight for survival. 
Clubs - seniority, loyalty, status, commitment, and "fitting in" are most important 
Baseball Team - talent and performance are considered critical. 
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SWO/CIDEF Interview Questions 
Background: 
YOS Time Onboard Ship type. Job Rank 
1. How much influence does the CO have in shaping culture and core values in this 
command? 
Academic - Individuals are carefully moved through training programs for career 
development. 
Fortress - Individuals are asked to engage in a turnaround and a fight for survival 
Club - seniority, loyalty, status, commitment, and "fitting in" are most important 
Baseball Team - talent and performance are considered critical. . 
2. How are core values exhibited in the fleet? 
3. How important are Navy customs and traditions in this command (fleet)? 
4. What customs and traditions are least important? 
5. Does today's GENDET sailor meet fleet expectations in the area of core values, customs 
and traditions, if so, what are those expectations? 
6. How are core values, customs and traditions re-enforced in this command (fleet)? 
7. What customs and traditions are most important for a new sailor to internalize? 
8. Is there anything you think I should know to assist me with my thesis? 
70 
APPENDIX B. E-2 REQUIREMENTS FROM THE MANUAL OF NAVY 
ENLISTED MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL CLASSIFICATION AND 
OCCUPATIONAL STANDARDS 
900 MILITARY REOUIREMENTS 
901 WATCH, OUARTERAND STATION BILL 
901201 PURPOSE AND CONTENT OF WATCH, QUARTER AND STATION BILL 
902 SEAMANSHIP 
902201 TERMINOLOGY USED IN DECK AND BOAT SEAMANSHIP 
902202 PROCEDURES FOR LOCATING AND REPORTING AN OBJECT BY 
RELATIVE BEARING AND POSITION ANGLE 
902203 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRUE AND RELATIVE BEARINGS 
902204 NOMENCLATURE OF DECK EQUIPMENT 
902205 SPLICING LINE AND TYING BASIC KNOTS 
902206 TYPES, SIZES AND MAINTENANCE OF LINE 
903 DRILL 
903201 INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS AND FACINGS WITHOUT ARMS 
904 UNIFORMS 
904201 MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SERVICE STRIPES 
904202 SLEEVE INSIGNIA AND COLLAR DEVICE IDENTIFICATION OF U.S. 
NAVY ENLISTED RATES AND RATINGS 
904203 GRADE INSIGNIA AND CORPS DEVICES OF U.S. NAVAL OFFICERS 
904204 REGULATIONS FOR CORRECT UPKEEP, WEARING AND MARKING OF 
U.S. NAVY ENLISTED UNIFORMS 
904205 REGULATIONS CONCERNING IDENTIFICATION TAGS AND 
IDENTIFICATION CARDS 
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904206 RANK INSIGNIA OF OTHER U.S. ARMED SERVICE PAY GRADES AND 
COMPARATIVE U.S. NAVY OFFICER RANKS AND ENLISTED RATES 
904207 REGULATIONS FOR CORRECT WEARING OF U.S. NAVY AWARDS 
904208 REGULATIONS CONCERNING PROPER GROOMING STANDARDS 
905 SMALL ARMs 
905201 PROCEDURES FOR FIRING THE SERVICE RIFLE AND PISTOL IN 
PRESCRIBED POSITIONS 
905202 PRECAUTIONS REQUIRED TO PREVENT HEARING LOSS WHEN 
EXPOSED TO SMALL ARMS FIRE 
906 WATCHSTANDING 
906201 PROCEDURES FOR RELIEVING AN ARMED WATCH 
906202 PROCEDURES FOR STANDING A PROPER MILITARY WATCH 
906203 ELEVEN GENERAL ORDERS OF A SENTRY (WATCH) 
906204 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LOOKOUT 
906205 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A MILITARY WATCH 
907 COMMUNICATIONS 
907201 STANDARD TELEPHONE PROCEDURES AND PHRASEOLOGY WHEN 
USING SOUND-POWERED TELEPHONES, DIAL TELEPHONES AND 
INTERCOMS 
907202 PROCEDURES TO BREAK-OUT, MAN, TEST AND SECURE A SHIPBOARD 
SOUND-POWERED HEADSET 
907203 PRONUNCIATION OF NUMBERS AND PHONETIC ALPHABET 
907204 COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 
907205 GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND EMERGENCY SIGNAL FLAGS AND 
PENNANTS 
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908 SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS 
908201 MAJOR TYPES OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT OF THE U.S. NAVY 
908202 NOMENCLATURE OF SUPERSTRUCTURE, DECKS AND COMPONENTS 
OF THE HULL 
908203 NUMBERING SYSTEM FOR DECKS 
908204 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND MISSION OF U.S. SHIPS AND 
AIRCRAFT 
908205 LETTERING AND NUMBERING SYSTEM FOR COMPARTMENTS 
910 PERSONNEL SAFETY 
911 SAFETY 
911201 HAZARDS WHEN ENTERING OR WORKING IN UNVENTILATED SPACES 
911202 HAZARDS WHEN USING C02 AND HALON 13-1 AS FIRE 
EXTINGUISHING AGENTS 
911203 PRECAUTIONS WHEN HANDLING AND STOWING FIRE 
EXTINGUISHERS 
911204 DANGERS INVOLVED IN HANDLING A CHARGED FIRE HOSE 
911205 DANGERS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATIONS OF AN INTERNAL 
COMBUSTION ENGINE IN AN UNVENTILATED SPACE 
911206 DANGERS OF ENERGIZING AND USING ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IN A 
SPACE FILLED WITH EXPLOSIVE VAPORS 
911207 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS WHEN EMBARKED IN SMALL BOATS 
911208 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOR RECREATION AND SPORTS 
911209 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS WHEN IN THE VICINITY OF AIRCRAFT 
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911210 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS INVOLVED IN WORKING WITH OR IN THE 
VICINITY OF: 
A. FUELS, PAINTS, APPROVED CLEANING AGENTS AND FLAMMABLES 
B. WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND PYROTECHNICS 
C. ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
D. COMPRESSED GASES 
E. COMPRESSED AIR 
F. LIQUIDS UNDER PRESSURE 
G.STEAM 
H. LIFELINES; LADDERS AND SCAFFOLDING 
1. HEAVY WEIGHT AND MOVING EQUIPMENT 
J. PERSONNEL ALOFT OR OVER THE SIDE 
K. VOIDS, TANKS AND CLOSED COMPARTMENTS 
L. CUTTING AND WELDING OPERATIONS 
M.POWER TOOLS 
N.ANTENNAS 
O. SUSPENDED LOADS 
P. FIBERGLASS AND ASBESTOS 
Q. HIGH NOISE LEVEL 
R. LINES UNDER TENSION 
S. ROTATING MACHINERY 
T. CAUSTIC LIQUIDS 
U. MARINE SANITATION SYSTEMS 
V. ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION 
W. HEAT AND COLD STRESS AREAS 
911211 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS WHEN OPERATING MOTOR VEHICLES 
911212 DECK SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 
911213 HAZARDS WHEN ENTERING SPACES WHERE C02 OR HALON 13-1 
EXTINGUISHERS HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED 
911214 LABELS, SIGNS AND SYMBOLS USED TO IDENTIFY HAZARDOUS 
MATERIAL 
911215 PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING SAFETY HAZARDS AND VIOLATIONS 
911216 USE AND MAINTENANCE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
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911217 PURPOSE, USE AND PROCEDURES OF THE NAVY TAG OUT SYSTEM 
911218 SAFETY PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW WHEN LIFTING OBJECTS 
911219 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS IN HANDLING FIRE ARMS 
912 FIRST AID AND PERSONAL HYGIENE 
912201 PROCEDURES FOR APPLYING A BATTLE DRESSING 
912202 PROCEDURES FOR CONTROL OF ARTERIAL AND VENOUS BLEEDING 
BY COMPRESS, FINGER PRESSURE AND TOURNIQUET 
912203 SYMPTOMS OF AND PROCEDURES TO PREPARE AND APPLY AN 
IMPROVISED SPLINT FOR CLOSED AND OPEN FRACTURES 
912204 PROCEDURES FOR CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION 
912205 PROCEDURES TO TRANSPORT AN INJURED PERSON BY FIREMAN'S 
LIFT, TIED-HANDS CRAWL AND STANDARD SHIPBOARD LITTERS 
912206 PREVENTION AND SYMPTOMS OF SEXUALL Y TRANSMITTED 
DISEASES 
912207 PURPOSE, GENERAL RULES AND LIMITATIONS OF FIRST AID 
912208 SYMPTOMS OF AND IMMEDIATE TREATMENT FOR SHOCK 
912209 PROCEDURES FOR RESCUING A PERSON IN CONTACT WITH AN 
ENERGIZED ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT AND SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT 
FOR ELECTRICAL SHOCK 
912210 SYMPTOMS OF AND FIRST AID TREATMENT FOR HEAT EXHAUSTION 
AND HEAT STROKE 
912211 SYMPTOMS, CLASSIFICATION AND FIRST AID TREATMENT OF BURNS 
912212 REASONS FOR MAINTAINING SANITARY CONDITIONS 
912213 BODY CLEANLINESS AND PERSONAL CARE OF THE FEET, HAIR AND 
SCALP 
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912214 PROCEDURES AND REQUIRED EQUIPMENT TO MAINTAIN GOOD ORAL 
HYGIENE 
912215 PROCEDURES FOR ABDOMINAL/CHEST THRUST TO REMOVE FOREIGN 
BODY OBSTRUCTION 
912216 PROCEDURES FOR ARTIFICIAL VENTILATION BY MOUTH-TO-MOUTH 
AND ALTERNATE METHODS 
913 SURVIVAL 
913201 PERFORM PRESCRIBED MINIMUM SWIMMING QUALIFICATIONS 
913202 USE OF CLOTHING AND BUOYANT OBJECTS FOR STAYING AFLOAT 
913203 CARE AND USE OF PERSONAL FLOATATION DEVICES 
913204 TECHNIQUES OF SWIMMING THROUGH OIL, FLAMES AND DEBRIS 
913205 PREPARATION AND METHODS FOR ABANDONING SHIPS 
913206 USE OF DESALTING EQUIPMENT AND METHODS OF OBTAINING 
FRESHWATER 
913207 EVASION, RESISTANCE AND ESCAPE WHILE IN ENEMY HELD 
TERRITORY 
913205 USE OF LIFE BOATS AND ASSOCIATED SURVIVAL GEAR 
913209 CONCEPTS OF LAND AND SEA SURVIVAL 
914 CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) DEFENSE 
914201 CARE AND USE OF PROTECTIVE MASK 
914202 USE OF EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING TO PROTECT AGAINST CBR 
CONTAMINATION 
914203 MARKERS USED TO INDICATE CBR CONTAMINATION 
914204 PURPOSE OF MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION-TEAMS 
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914205 METHODS OF DISSEMINATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
AGENTS 
914206 PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION 
914207 USE OF ATROPINE AS AN ANTIDOTE FOR NERVE AGENTS 
914208 SELF AID AND FIRST AID METHODS IN COUNTERING THE EFFECTS OF 
NERVE, BLISTER, BLOOD, CHOKING AND CHEMICAL AGENTS 
914209 EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR RADIATION (ALPHA, BETA, GAMMA AND 
NEUTRONS) 
914210 AREA DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES ASHORE AND AFLOAT 
914211 PROPERTIES OF CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) AGENTS 
914212 PROTECTION AFFORDED BY EACH LEVEL OF MISSION ORIENTED 
PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) 
920 MATERIAL CONDITION 
921 DAMAGE CONTROL 
921201 THE FOUR CLASSES OF FIRE AND HOW EACH CLASS IS DETERMINED 
921202 RECOMMENDED EXTINGUISHING AGENTS FOR EACH CLASS OF FIRE 
921203 PROCEDURES TO REPORT A FIRE OR OTHER CASUALTY 
921204 LETTERS AND SYMBOLS THAT DESIGNATE THE MATERIAL 
CONDITIONS OF READINESS 
921205 COMPARTMENTATION AND ITS USE IN MAINTAINING WATERTIGHT 
INTEGRITY 
921206 FIRE TRIANGLE IN TERMS OF FIRE PREVENTION AND FIREFIGHTING 
921207 CONDITIONS THAT CAUSE SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION 
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921208 GOOD HOUSEKEEPING PRACTICES FOR FIRE PREVENTION 
921209 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A REPAIR PARTY 
921210 SHIPBOARD PIPING IDENTIFICATION CODING SYSTEM 
921211 USE AND STOWAGE OF DAMAGE CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND 
SYSTEMS 
921212 FUNCTION AND USE OF THE OXYGEN BREATHING APPARATUS (OBA) 
921213 THE THREE MAJOR MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF READINESS 
921214 PROCEDURES FOR BREAKING WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY AND DARKEN 
SHIP 
921215 DAMAGE CONTROL ORGANIZATION 
921216 IDENTIFICATION OF DAMAGE CONTROL LOCKERS AND USE OF 
CONTENTS 
921217 METHODS AND PROCEDURES FOR COMMUNICATIONS IN A DAMAGE 
CONTROL SITUATION 
921218 PROCEDURE AND REASON FOR SETTING MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF 
READINESS 
921219 USE AND STOWAGE OF EMERGENCY ESCAPE BREATHING DEVICE 
(EEBD) 
921220 SHIPBOARD EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
921221 PURPOSE AND PRECEDENCE OF SHIPBOARD EMERGENCY ALARMS 
921222 ACTION TAKEN WHEN EMERGENCY ALARM IS SOUNDED 
922 SURFACE PRESERVATION 
922201 CLEANING AND STOWING OF PAINTING EQUIPMENT 
922202 PURPOSE FOR CLEANING AND PRESERVATION 
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922203 EQUIPMENT, METHODS AND PROCEDURES FOR PREPARING AND 
PAINTING A SURFACE 
922204 METHODS AND PROCEDURES FOR PRESERVING SURF ACES NOT TO BE 
PAINTED 
930 MILITARY CONDUCT AND JUSTICE 
930201 AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY POLICE 
930202 CONTENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES STATED IN ARTICLES I THROUGH 
VI OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
930203 GENERAL CONTENT OF NAVY REGULATIONS, CHAPTER 8 (ARTICLES 
0801-0803,0810-0816,0825-0826,0829-0830,0834 AND 0847) AND 
CHAPTER 11 
930204 PURPOSE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT 
930205 GENERAL CONTENT OF UCMJ ARTICLES 2, 3, 7-15, 25, 27,31,37,38,55, 
77-134 AND 137-139 
940 PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
941 CAREER INFORMATION 
941201 PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
941202 REASONS FOR AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF 
DISCHARGES 
941203 ENLISTED CAREER STRUCTURE 
941204 ENLISTED PERFORMANCE EV ALUA TION SYSTEM 
941206 REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVANCEMENT OF NONRATED PERSONNEL 
941207 EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES 
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941208 CONTENTS OF THE ENLISTED SERVICE RECORD 
941210 GOVERNMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
941212 INCENTIVES FOR A NAVY CAREER 
941213 SEA DUTY, SHORE DUTY AND NEUTRAL DUTY 
941214 PURPOSE OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD 
941215 MILITARY PAY ENTITLEMENTS AND LEAVE AND EARNINGS 
STATEMENT CONTENT 
941216 REQUIREMENTS FOR GOOD CONDUCT MEDAL 
941217 LEAVE AND LIBERTY PROCEDURES 
941218 DEPENDENTS RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS 
941219 DUTY PREFERENCE FORMS 
941221 CAREER REENLISTMENT OBJECTIVES (CREO) 
. 942 TRAINING 
942201 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS STANDARDS (PQS) SYSTEM 
944 MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
944291 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SIGNING OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION 
950 NAVAL TRADITION 
951 SEA POWER 
951201 NAVAL HISTORY AND THE EVOLUTION OF TODA Y'S NAVY 
951202 ROLES AND MISSION OF THE NAVY 
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952 CUSTOMS AND COURTESIES 
952201 PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING COLORS 
952202 MILITARY COURTESIES REQUIRED DURING COLORS 
952203 PROCEDURES FOR PROPER HANDLING OF THE ENSIGN AND JACK 
952204 HOW, WHEN AND TO WHOM THE INDIVIDUAL HAND SALUTE IS 
RENDERED 
952205 MILITARY COURTESIES REQUIRED WHEN: 
A. BOARDING AND LEAVING A NAVAL VESSEL 
B. CROSSING OR BEING IN THE VICINITY OF THE QUARTERDECK 
C. THE NATIONAL ENSIGN PASSES OR THE NATIONAL ANTHEM IS 
PLAYED 
D. PASSING, MEETING, ADDRESSING, INTRODUCING,REPL YING TO, 
WALKING OR RIDING WITH AN OFFICER OF THE U.S. OR FOREIGN 
ARMED FORCES 
E. ADDRESSING AND INTRODUCING ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF THE 
U.S. ARMED FORCES 
F. SHIP AND BOAT PASSING HONORS ARE RENDERED AND WHEN IN 
THE VICINITY OF A GUN SALUTE 
953 ORGANIZATION 
953201 PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND 
953202 SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE STANDARD ORGANIZATION AND 
REGULATIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY 
953203 STANDARD UNIT ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH 
DEPARTMENT 
953204 PURPOSE AND CONTENT OF THE SHIP OR COMMAND'S 
ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONS MANUAL 
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960 LEADERSHIP 
961201 FOLLOWERS HIP AND LEADERSHIP 
970 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
970201 GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS CONCERNING 
TREATMENT AND RIGHTS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 
970202 GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT 
CONCERNING MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES 
970203 INFORMATION PRISONERS OF WAR ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE 
WHEN QUESTIONED 
970204 GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE LA W OF ARMED CONFLICT 
980 SECURITY REOUIREMENTS 
980201 GENERAL SCOPE AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND 
PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND 
MATERIAL 
A. PURPOSE OF SECURITY BILL 
B. SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATTER 
C. SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS 
D. COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER 
E. SECURITY CLEARANCES 
F. SECURITY AREAS 
G. MARKING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL 
H. PERSONAL CENSORSIDP 
1. REPORTING SECURITY VIOLATIONS 
J. REPORTING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES 
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990 PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 
99020 1 NAVY SPONSOR PROGRAM 
990202 ENERGY CONSERVATION 
990203 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND POLLUTION CONTROL 
990204 MILITARY CASH AWARDS 
990205 OVERSEAS DUTY SUPPORT 
990206 HEALTH AND PHYSICAL READINESS PROGRAM 
990207 PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT 
990208 PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
990209 SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
990210 STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
990211 NAVY INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY PROGRAM 
990212 STATE AND NATIONAL VOTING PROCEDURES 
990213 EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAM 
990214 FAMILY OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM 
990215 POLICY FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
990216 POLICY REGARDING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
CONSEQUENCES FOR DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE 
990217 NAVAL OFFICER COMMISSION PROGRAMS 
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